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Reflection on the Borders of Language 
and Speech in Light of Discoveries in Zoosemiotics
Refleksja nad granicami języka i mowy 
w obliczu odkryć zoosemiotyki
Abstrakt
Głównym problemem, który poruszam w  ni-
niejszym artykule są granice języka i  mowy, 
wytyczane wspólnie przez nauki społeczno-
-humanistyczne i  matematyczno-przyrod-
nicze, zwłaszcza – fuzję semiotyki i  biologii, 
czyli biosemiotyki. W  tekście formułuję tezę, 
zgodnie z  którą zdolności i  umiejętności 
biokomunikacyjne zwierząt ludzkich i  nie-
-ludzkich dzieli dystans: zarazem ilościowy 
i  jakościowy, przy czym: (pre)adaptacje filo-
genetyczne i  (pre)dyspozycje ontogenetyczne 
zwierząt ludzkich i  nie-ludzkich są z  jednej 
strony komunikacyjnie – dyskretne, z drugiej 
strony kognitywnie i  behawioralnie – kon-
tynualne. Wyniki badań empirycznych, które 
przytoczyłem i  skomentowałem, pozwalają 
sądzić, że istnieją cechy biokomunikacyjne 
swoiście ludzkie.
Słowa klucze: granice języka i  mowy, uniwer-
salia językowe, biolingwistyka, zoosemiotyka
Размышление о границах языка и речи 
перед лицом открытий зоосемиотики
Абстракт
Основная проблема, которую автор обсуж-
дает в этой статье, – это границы языка 
и речи, очерченные совместно социаль-
но-гуманитарными науками, математикой 
и естественными науками, особенно – сли-
янием семиотики и биологии, то есть био-
семиотики. В работе формулируется тезис, 
согласно которому биокоммуникационные 
способности и навыки человеческих су-
ществ и животных находятся на некотором 
расстоянии друг от друга: как количествен-
но, так и качественно, где филогенетические 
(пре)адаптации и онтогенетические (пред)
расположенности человеческих существ 
и животных, с одной стороны, коммуни-
кативно – незаметны, с другой стороны, 
когнитивно и поведенчески – постоянны. 
Результаты эмпирических исследований 
позволяют предположить, что существуют 
специфические особенности человеческой 
биокоммуникации.
Ключевые слова: границы языка и речи, 
лингвистические универсалии, биолингви-
стика, зоосемиотика
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No disciplined and rigorous reflection on language and speech can turn a blind 
eye to two issues; first, How do language and speech exist? and, second, How 
is language and speech learned? Which together presuppose the answer to 
a  third (and key) question: What are language and speech? In other words, it 
is impossible to discuss the ontological and gnoseological attributes of language 
and speech until attempts are made to define the content and scope of both 
terms (and I do not have to add here that there is no, and probably never will 
be, universal agreement in this regard but, nonetheless, I believe it is worth the 
effort to seek a  consensus).
I present to the reader an article that reviews the question of the boundaries 
of language and speech. In this paper, I  take the position that the expression of 
terms: language and speech are formulated either with the use of an internal-
linguistic or external-linguistic perspective. In other words, their definitions are 
constructed either on the basis of linguistics (and its programs), for example, 
by comparing many ethnic languages with each other, or within sciences other 
than linguistics (both socio-humanistic and mathematical-natural), for example, 
by comparing one natural language and many animal codes.
The main problem I raise in this article concerns the boundaries of language 
and speech that are delineated both by social sciences, the humanities, mathemat-
ics, and natural sciences, especially by the fusion of semiotics and biology, or bio-
semiotics. At the same time, I have a strong belief (a belief bordering on certainty) 
that the assumptions and discoveries made in the field of biosemiotics (and its sub-
disciplines, including zoosemiotics) can shed new light on what the entities: lan-
guage and speech are. Moreover, it is likely that these assumptions and discoveries 
will lead to the need for reinterpretation of the content and scope of both terms.
Biosemiotic problems are of great interest to the representatives of various 
scientific disciplines. It is notable that in Polish-language publications philo-
sophical views1 dominate, while specialists in the field of biocommunications, 
that is, biologists and linguists, have very little to say on the matter. This paper 
sets out to fill this literary gap and, as such, is an attempt at a  linguistic inter-
pretation of biological observations, also in terms of the dispute that pro- and 
anti-naturalistic advocates have had with each other for many years. I  would 
like to recall that the discussion between pro-naturalism and anti-naturalism 
on language and speech first of all centers on the fact that advocates (anti-
naturalists) are trying to show that some features of language and speech are 
only human, while their opponents (pro-naturalists) say that all features of 
 1 Honorata Korpikiewicz, Biokomunikacja. Jak zwierzęta porozumiewają się ze światem 
(Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 2011); Łukasz Kwiatek, Przemów, a cię ochrzczę. O mał-
pach wychowanych przez człowieka (Kraków: Copernicus Center Press, 2017).
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language and speech are also human, where strong features, which are only 
human, and weak features, which are also human, have their nature: being 
either stricto communicative or largo communicative, including cognitive and/
or behavioral (the problem with any reflection on language and speech is that 
it is not known whether there are phylogenetic (pre)adaptations and strictly 
communicative ontogenetic (pre)dispositions, which are not both cognitive and/
or behavioral). Consequently, if the null hypothesis states that language and 
speech are phylogenetic (pre)adaptations and ontogenetic (pre)dispositions (sui 
generis) that are human-unique only, then the research I refer to is intended to 
confer or corroborate the null hypothesis.
2. Development
Biosemiotics, the science of the semiosphere within the biosphere, identifies 
signs (semiosis) and life phenomena (biosis) with each other to eventually 
integrate them into a  single biological-semiotic process (direction) – biosemio-
sis, which is the reference point for biosemiotic disciplines and programs.2 
Biosemiotics explores the phenomenon of biocommunication, putting an  em-
phasis on its perspectives: dynamic  (the problem of ontogenesis and (its) phy-
logenesis) and static (the problem of structure and (its) function). In particular, 
biosemiotics explores the relationships between, on the one hand, the code 
(sign) and, on the other hand, between the sender and receiver (subject of the 
sign), between the context (object of the sign), message (construct of the sign), 
and contact (substrate of the sign). Therefore, in the following paragraphs 
I  am going to discuss the results of the following observations: biopragmatic, 
biosemantic, biogrammatic, and biodiacritical, constantly bearing in mind the 
question of whether some (pre)adaptations and (pre)dispositions can be found 
in the biocommunication domain as strong, only human, traits.
Biosemiotics, as a broader field, is interested in the signaling communication 
of all living organisms, while zoosemiotics, which is a narrower field, specializes 
in the study of signaling in the animal kingdom. It is important to note that 
zoosemiotic reflection on the boundaries of information representation and in-
terpretation of intentions focuses on similarities and differences in communica-
tion between representatives of, among others, two groups: mammals and birds, 
that is, higher animals, who are closest to humans in terms of phylogenetics 
(mammals) and ontogenetics (birds), cf. the search for, on the one hand, mam-
malian homologies in terms of language and, on the other hand, avian analogies 





















in terms of speech. In summation, zoosemiotics penetrates the phenomena of 
communication in the world of mammals and birds, where research (natural 
and artificial, active and passive – as discussed further on) concerns, on the 
one hand, bird species: (neo)gnathae and (non-)passerine, (non-)galliformes and 
(non-)songbirds and, on the other hand, mammal species: viviparous, placental, 
and primates, including Old World anthropoids and New World anthropoids, 
guenons and apes, gibbons, and hominidae.
Biosemiotics is currently developing in two parallel directions: natural and 
artificial, where natural communication and artificial communication are dif-
ferent in that either humans are trying to teach humans non-human commu-
nication, or humans are trying to teach non-humans human communication; 
more precisely, either humans are trying to communicate with non-humans 
using non-natural components and communication goals for humans and non-
humans, or humans are trying to communicate with non-humans using com-
ponents and communication goals that are natural for humans and not natural 
for non-humans. In practice, however, these research approaches complement 
each other, accompanying each other in different proportions.3
2.1. (More) natural biocommunication
2.1.1. Biopragmatic discoveries
The main research issue in biopragmatics takes the form of two alternative 
questions: Is the subject, associated with a  sign (only), intentional or (also) 
inferential? Is the interaction encountered in the animal world competitive or 
cooperative?
2.1.1.1. Observations
Many observations have been made and many experiments have been carried 
out that shed some light on how (non-human) animals,4 especially great apes, 
 3 Research on animal communication in natural and artificial environments differ from 
each other, for instance, in terms of applied research methods: active and passive. The study of 
animal communication in natural conditions is carried out in such a manner that, first, (passive) 
observations are made to formulate hypotheses and, second, (active) experiments are carried 
out to test these hypotheses. Research on animal communication in an artificial environment 
is carried out in such a manner that, first, (active) experiments are run to formulate hypotheses, 
and, second, (passive) observations are made to test these hypotheses. Of course, studies using 
research methods like active (experiments) and passive (observations) differ from one another 
in that active research (experiment) supposes the active influence of the investigator on the 
subject, and that passive research (observation) supposes the passive observation of the subject 
by the investigator (observation).
 4 In my article I  try (!) to avoid the automatic opposition that is “imposed” by colloquial 
language, cf. human and animal. Therefore, I  consciously use the term “non-human animals” 
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specifically chimpanzees, process messages at the biopragmatic level; inter alia 
the main questions posed by the researchers are whether animals feel compas-
sion (decentration) and can work together (cooperation), as well as whether they 
are likely to cheat (deception).
Decentration
It has been found that some animals (chimpanzees) are able to share someone 
else’s point of view and have some potential in the field of the theory of mind.
First of all, it has been observed that when an individual occupying a  low 
position in the group sees that food is in the view of another individual occu-
pying a higher position in the group, the lower status individual will not reach 
for the said food, and when the lower position individual sees that food is not 
in the view of another high-raking individual, the lower status individual in 
the group will reach for the food.5
Second, an experiment was carried out in which the investigators (humans) 
presented to the subjects (animals) scenes that took place in a room containing 
two people, two containers, and one object. The animals observed a sequence of 
several consecutive and related situations, for instance, person1 put the object 
in container1; person2 saw that person1 put the object in container1; person1 
went (without the object) from room1 to room2; person2 pulled the object out 
of container1, put the object into container2 and went (without the object) from 
room1 to room3 (or person2 pulled the object out of container2 and went (with 
the object) from room1 to room3); person1 went from room2  to room1 and 
began looking for the object. It is important to note, that when person1 went 
from room2 to room1 (when he returned) and began looking for the object, 
the animals focused (fixed) their eyes on person1 and on container1 (the study 
was conducted with the use of an eye tracker), which proves that they accepted 
the perspective of person1 who was looking for the object. The animals knew 
that, first, the object was not in the container1 and, second, that person1 did 
not know (because the researcher left room1) where the object was, but thought 
that the object was in container1 (because the researcher put it there before 
leaving room1). The experiment was a  modification of a  test. The original 
version was intended for people who used speech, for instance, children and 
adults, and the second was for those who did not talk, like human infants 
and animals, where the first version expected a  verbal response (answers to 
(“zwierzęta nie-ludzkie” in Polish) borrowed from English, cf. the commonly accepted term 
non-human animals in the sense of “animals not being human” (“zwierzęta niebędące ludźmi” 
in Polish) (the hyphen is meant to emphasize the power of negation de re).
 5 Josep Bräuer, Josep Call, and Michael Tomasello, “Chimpanzees Really Know What 




















a  question), while the second measured a  physiological answer (movement of 
the eyes, direct of sight).6 
It has also been found that some animals (chimpanzees) can understand 
someone else’s intentions. First, it has been observed that in a  situation when 
a  caregiver objectively could not, even if he/she subjectively wished to, share 
food with the animal, the animal reacted calmly, whereas in a situation when 
the caregiver subjectively did not want to, even if he/she objectively could 
share food with the animal, the animal reacted nervously.7 Second, it has been 
observed that some animals (chimpanzees) transmit the intention of (meta)
communication to each other in such a way that they absorb the attention of 
the recipient, for example, by hitting a  rock or poking a  hand, and initiate 
interaction with the recipient, for instance, by the raising of an arm or pat-
ting of the hand.8
Cooperation
It has been found that animals could not understand the essence of coopera-
tion, but can cooperate in situations where, first, they anticipate their future 
profit (reward), and, second, when they receive someone’s explicit request 
(demand).
At first, an experiment was conducted in which the researchers (humans) 
presented the subjects (human children and adult chimpanzees) with a scenario 
involving two people and two objects: a stapler and scissors. The script included 
several scenes, for example, person1 stapled the cards with a  stapler, then put 
the stapler in its place1 and left the room; person2 entered the room, then put 
the stapler in a  different place2 and left the room; person1 entered the room 
and, having not found the stapler in place1, began looking for it all over the 
room. The children, looking at how person1 was looking for the stapler, started 
pointing (altruistically) to show person1 the place2 where the stapler was, and 
stopped pointing when person1 found the stapler (interestingly, the children 
were not interested in the scissors, which were next to the stapler in place1). 
The chimpanzees, when looking at the subsequent scenes, showed no intention 
 6 Christopher Krupenye, Fumihiro Kano, Satoshi Hirata, Josep Call, and Michael Tomasello, 
“Great Apes Anticipate That Other Individuals Will Act According to False Beliefs,” Science 354, 
no. 6308 (2016): 110–114.
 7 Josep Call, Brian Hare, Malinda Carpenter, and Michael Tomasello, “Unwilling versus 
Unable: Chimpanzees Understanding of Human Intentional Action,” Developmental Science 7, 
no. 4 (2004): 488–498.
 8 Katie E. Slocombe, Tanja Kaller, Laurel Turman, Simon W. Townsend, Sarah Papworth, 
and Klaus Zuberbühler, “Production of Food-associated Calls in Wild Male Chimpanzees Is 
Dependent on the Composition of the Audience,” Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 64, no. 12 
(2010): 1959–1966.
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of helping (sharing knowledge) and showed no intention of cooperating, for 
example, by giving explicit (deictic) guidance.9 
Second, an experiment was carried out in which the researcher (human) 
looked for a tool (key) with which he could open a box containing food which 
the researcher (would) like to use either for the subject tested or for himself. 
In that experiment human (children) and chimpanzee (adults) individuals were 
test subjects. The children spontaneously pointed the researcher where the tool 
was even when the researcher was using it to obtain food only for himself. The 
chimpanzees indicated to the researcher where the tool was only when the 
researcher used it to get food for them alone.10
Third, an experiment was carried out, in which, on the one hand, the re-
searcher (human) created a motivational situation and cooperative pressure on 
the subjects (animals), and, on the other hand, the subjects selected information 
and communicated their intentions with the aid of a  keyboard. Two common 
chimpanzees, Austin and Sherman, were taught to communicate using a  lexi-
gram board (similar to a  keypad with keys), whereby the connection between 
keys and lexigrams met two conditions: the condition of equivalence of signs 
and words and the condition of substitution of signs and objects. The experi-
mental situation was such that Sherman was in one room with a  container of 
food, and Austin was in another room with the key to the container of food. 
The first room and the second were connected in such a  way that the objects 
could be freely shared between them. Austin and Sherman shared common 
goals and had a  common means of achieving them, namely, the motivational 
goal of the food in the container. The means to achieve this (further) goal was 
the key to the container, the instrumental goal was the key to the box, and 
the means to achieving this (closer) goal was the keyboard for communication. 
Austin and Sherman, therefore, were put in such a situation that, having no other 
choice, they had to cooperate with each other. The communication took place 
in such a way that, first, Sherman sent a message to Austin (using the lexigram 
keyboard) asking him for the key to the container (then, Austin gave the key 
to Sherman, and Sherman opened the container and took the food out of it), 
and second, Austin sent a  message to Sherman (using the lexigram keyboard) 
asking him for food from the container (then, Sherman divided the food, gave 
it to Austin, and Austin ate his share). Interestingly, the animals were better at 
 9 Ulf Liszkowski, Malinda Carpenter, Tricia Striano, and Michael Tomasello, “12- and 
18-month-olds Point to Provide Information for Others,” Journal of Cognition and Development 7, 
no. 2 (2006): 173–187.
 10 Anke Bullinger, Juliane Kaminski, Felizitas Zimmerman, and Michael Tomasello, 
“Different Social Motives in the Gestural Communication of Chimpanzees and Human Children,” 




















solving the task when the reward was meant for them than when the reward 
was meant for someone else, for instance, their caregivers.11
Fourth, an experiment was carried out in which two unrelated individu-
als were placed in two booths from where they could observe each other. The 
first individual had juice in a carton (within the reach of its hand) and a stick. 
A straw was needed to drink the juice through it (in the carton), while the sec-
ond individual had juice in a bottle (beyond the reach of its hand) and a straw 
and needed a  stick to draw the juice with it (in the bottle). It is important to 
note that in one version the individuals had the tools they needed on both sides, 
that is to say, both the first individual and the other individual had them. In 
the second version, the individuals had the necessary tools unilaterally, that is, 
one individual had them, and the other individual did not. It turned out that (in 
both versions), first, if one individual asked the other, for example, by extending 
his arm towards him, he received the tool needed: a  straw or a  stick, respec-
tively, and, second, if one individual did not ask the other, he did not receive 
the tool needed. Animals, especially monkeys, particularly apes, in particular 
hominids, function socially in such a  manner that observing the situation of 
another individual does not make them rush to help. The necessary condition 
is appropriate communication. In this way, helping on demand is an economic 
strategy, namely, inventing (on its own) may prove unnecessary, and responding 
(to someone’s request) may be profitable.12
Deception
The literature provides several examples of the phenomenon of deception, with 
some observations resulting in numerous interpretations, both stronger and 
weaker.
First of all, deceptive behavior has been observed in some mammals (mon-
keys). For instance, it has been noted that monkeys transmit an alarm message 
in the context of food, that is, when a  group was foraging and a  predator was 
not hunting, which caused the group (receiver) to escape from the announced 
threat and the individual (sender) to obtain the abandoned food. It was noted 
that chimpanzees transmitted a  food message in the context of good quality 
food in abundant quantities, but did not transmit a  food message when food 
quality was low and in small quantities.13
 11 Sue E. Savage-Rumbaugh, Ape Language: From Conditioned Response to Symbol (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
 12 Shinya Yamamoto, Tatyana Humle, and Masayuki Tanaka, “Chimpanzees Help Each 
Other upon Request,” Public Library of Science 4, no. 10 (October 2009): 1–7, https://doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pone.0007416.
 13 Marc D. Hauser and Richard W. Wrangham, “Manipulation of Food Calls in Captive 
Chimpanzees,” Folia Primatologica 48 (1987): 207–210.
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Second, deceptive behavior has been observed in some birds (hens). For 
instance, it has been observed that a  male is more likely to transmit a  food 
message when there was a female (partner) nearby than when there was a male 
(rival) nearby. It has been observed that the male is more likely to transmit an 
alarm message when there was a  blood relative nearby than when there was 
non-blood relative in the proximity.14
The problem of interpreting deceptive observations is that, on the one hand, 
subjective and individual observations are often difficult to test with objective 
and repetitive experiments. On the other hand, one observation in different 
(weaker or stronger) formulations sometimes explains many hypotheses with 
different (stronger and weaker) assumptions, cf. the stronger (Machiavellian) 
hypothesis, which states that a male (rooster) deceives a male (rival) by sending 
a  message that eliminates the relationship of form and content in the signal, 
and the weaker (legal) hypothesis, which states that the male is courting the 
female (partner) by transmitting a message that cultivates a relationship of form 
and content in the signal, with the form of the sign being of a food nature and 
the content of the sign being of a  sexual nature (it is interesting to note, that 
in half of the cases when the male transmitted a  food message to the female, 
food was unavailable to both).
I  would like to recall that the methodology of biosemiotic research uses 
the so-called Occam’s razor, which is realized as a  postulate: either (neo)be-
havioral (Morgan’s Canon) or (neo)cognitive (Martinelli’s Canon). In any case, 
the point is that, first, in a  situation where there are alternative explanations, 
simplification suppresses complication, and, in a  situation where there are no 
alternative explanations, complication suppresses the simplification. In this view, 
the phenomenon of deception usually finds simpler expressions, for instance, 
something more behavioral and less cognitive.15
2.1.1.2. Interpretations
Differences in communication between human and non-human animals at the 
biopragmatic level are reduced to the fact that while in the human world the 
sender and the recipient, when communicating, cooperate with each other be-
cause the sender wants the recipient to know something from the recipient. In 
the animal world the sender and the recipient, when communicating, compete 
with each other because the sender wants the recipient to do something for the 
sender. In other words, animals compete more willingly and better (with each 
other) than they cooperate; to be more precise, they compete instinctively, but 
cooperate instrumentally. In the process of communication, humans cooperate 
 14 Marcel Gyger and Peter Marler, “Food Calling in the Domestic Fowl, Gallus gallus: The 
Role of External Referents and Deception,” Animal Behaviour 36 (1988): 358–365.
 15 Robert W. Mitchell and Nicolas N. Thompson, eds., Deception: Perspectives on Human 





















informally and altruistically, and animals cooperate manipulatively and egotisti-
cally, cf. blood relatives and coalitions of kindred individuals. From this point 
of view, human communication is collectively cooperative (group as a goal), and 
animal communication is individually cooperative (group as a  means). Let me 
remind you that cooperation stricte does not mean that someone1 does some-
thing separately for someone2, but someone2 does something separately for 
someone1, but rather someone1 and someone2 do something together. In this 
way, cooperation does not take place in the me and you mode, but in the us 
mode. Meanwhile, humans (also) conformistically take the perspective of the 
first plural person (we), and animals (only) specifically adopt the perspective of 
the first singular person (I). For instance, hunting is done in such a  way that 
one individual chases the victim, a second individual surrounds the victim, and 
a third individual catches the victim. In other words, successive individuals join 
the hunt, cutting off the victim’s escape route, while each individual wants to 
occupy the most convenient position in order to get food for themselves (in light 
of this, it can be assumed that hunting is self-organized – without a  top-down 
scenario and division into roles, because these are born spontaneously on the 
foundations of selfish competition).16
Let me remind you that biocommunication is a  game of (non-)iterated pris-
oner dilemma, while an evolutionarily stable communication strategy is a tit for 
tat strategy, that is, friendly strategy, in a  situation when the sender begins an 
altruistic game with the recipient, and merciful strategy, when the sender does 
not continue an altruistic game with the recipient. Blood relations and mutual 
altruism lies at the heart of animal communication, but human communication 
is based on (non-)blood relations and (non-)mutual altruism, while communica-
tion based on kinship or mutual altruism becomes stable if it meets the follow-
ing conditions: first (for relative altruism ): br > c, where: r is the “relationship: 
genes of the sender in the genes of the recipient,” c is the “cost of the sender” 
and b is the “benefit of the recipient,” and the second (for mutual altruism): bs 
> c, where: s is “non-blood kinship: the sender’s profit in the recipient’s profit,” 
b is the “recipient’s benefit” and c is “the sender’s cost.” Animal communication 
assumes natural competition and is inherently evolutionarily stable. Human 
communication assumes natural cooperation and is not evolutionarily stable, 
that is to say, humans effectively exchange information with each other, even 
though the sender and the recipient are not (always) related by blood or just 
related, and the messages they transmit and receive are not (always) energy-
expensive and are not necessarily true.17
 16 Michael Tomasello, Origins of Human Communication (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2008).
 17 Robert L. Trivers, “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,” The Quarterly Review of Biology 
46 (1971): 35–57; Robert Axelrod and William D. Hamilton, “The Evolution of Cooperiation,” 
Science 211 (1981): 1390–1396; Gilbert Roberts, “Cooperation through Interdependence,” Animal 
Behaviour 70 (2005): 901–908.
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Human communication is based on several specifically human, cognitive, 
and behavioral foundations, inter alia, people share common views, knowledge, 
goals and actions, since by their nature they trust each other, help each other, 
share with each other, and punish each other for lack of reciprocity (while 
feeling an internal, endocrinal, reward or punishment). It is important to note 
that each of these features is closely related to communication. For instance, 
communication in the sense of helping each other by sharing trustworthy 
information with them, although people manifest altruistic motivations and 
cooperative inclinations when they learn to point, even before they begin to 
speak. Namely, people communicate with each other in such a  way (most 
often) that they share knowledge with each other: either pointing someone 
to something (ostensive information), or telling something to someone (verbal 
information), cf. (co)work for (co)knowledge. In contrast, animals transmit and 
receive messages that perform (simultaneously) multiple functions (at most one 
main and at least one secondary), while animal messages perform – as the main 
function (primary figure) – an expressive and/or aesthetic (minimal) function 
or an impressive and/or a  fictive (maximum) function, but not a  referential 
and/or reflexive function, where the reference function can play the role of one 
of several side functions (background) in animated messages. For instance, it 
has been noted that chimpanzees communicate via gestures, yet they do not 
use declarative gestures as a  referential function, but imperative gestures as an 
expressive function or intentional gestures as a  fictive function. Moreover, it 
has not been observed that chimpanzees (either in a  natural or artificial set-
ting) use gestures as deictic and demonstrative functions, that is to say, they 
do not indicate or show anything. They just do not understand the cooperative 
function of gestures. For instance, it has been observed that animals compete 
with a caregiver for food both when an animal sees (and understands) that the 
caregiver wants to (selfishly) obtain food (by reaching for the unhidden food 
that the animal sees), and when the animal sees (but does not understand) that 
the caregiver wants to (altruistically) help the animal obtain food (by pointing 
at the hidden food that the animal does not see).18
Differences in human and non-human communication at the pragmatic 
level (and, consequently, at subsequent levels, inter alia, semantic, grammatical, 
and diacritical levels), result from human and non-human animals communi-
cating in different ways. Namely, animals communicate explicitly (semantically) 
by means of code (signals), transmitting messages to each other, and humans 
communicate implicitly (pragmatically) by means of ostension (suggestions), 
suggesting interpretations to each other. In this view, human communication 
combines two phenomena: communication of intention and communication of 
information, cf. the assumptions and assertions of implication theory and rel-
 18 Michael Tomasello, “Why Don’t Ape s Point?,” in Roots of Human Sociality, ed. Norman 





















evance theory,19 which states that, paradoxically, people communicate more and 
much more effectively when they do not say what they want to say, or when they 
say something different (or more or less than they should in a given situation), 
instead of what they want to say. The sender and the receiver equally share 
the energy costs and information profits of the communication, cf. the sender 
suggests something to the receiver, and the receiver infers something  via the 
sender, cf. the suggestion: “You know what (q) I mean by saying that p” and the 
inference: “I  know what (q) you mean by saying that p.” In summation, there 
is no more than one level in animal communication: direct and literal, and 
in human communication, there is at least one level: (non-)direct and (non-)
literal. In other words, animals communicate through statements, and humans 
communicate through under-statements. It is important, however, that it has 
turned out that some species of animals have a theory of mind (to an intentional 
degree not higher than the second degree; only humans, thanks to language 
and speech, can reach higher and further), that is, the capability and ability to 
decentrate (meta-represent), namely, they understand that others are guided not 
by what the world is like, but by what they think about what the world is like, 
and thus they are capable of reflection (reading someone’s mind), the essence 
of which is reflected in the formula: “I think that you (don’t) think that (~)p.”20
2.1.2. Biosemantic discoveries
The main research problem of biosemantics takes the form of two alternative 
questions: Is the object which the sign is associated with is (only) intentional 
or (also) extentional? Is the signaling that can be found in the animal world 
indexable or symbolic?
2.1.2.1. Observations
Many observations and experiments have been made that shed light on how 
(non-human) animals, especially monkeys, process messages at the biosemantic 
level.
First, it was found that communication signaling alarm by some mammals 
(guenons) occurs in such a way that the sender stimulates the recipient (screams 
and runs away), and the recipient reacts to the sender (looks up and runs away). 
The observations conducted made it possible to establish that the alarm reper-
toire of monkeys includes at least three signals associated with a  certain type 
(stimulus) of threat (attack by predatory animals) and with the corresponding 
 19 Paul H. Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” in Speech Acts, ed. Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan 
(London: Brill, 1975), 41–58; Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, Relevance: Communication and 
Cognition (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
 20 Ida Kurcz, “Communicative Competence and Theory of Mind,” Psychology of Language 
and Communication, 8(2) (2004): 5–18; Josep Call and Michael Tomasello, “Does the Chimpanzee 
Have a Theory of Mind? 30 Years Later,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(5) (2008): 189–192.
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type (response) of shelter (rescue in camouflaging plants), where: the types of 
threats and shelters correspond to each other, cf. mammal (cat: leopard) and 
tree (crown), bird (eagle: warrior) and shrub (undergrowth), reptile (snake: 
python) and grass (wool). In other words, action and reaction are intercon-
nected in such a manner that the communication between the sender and the 
recipient is connected by two (hypothetical) components, namely, information 
about the threat (what is it?) and a  tendency to hide (what to do?). The experi-
ments carried out consisted of screams being recorded (sound was recorded), 
and, second, screams were sent out (sound was played) and reactions were 
recorded (images were recorded). For example, the orientation of the recipient 
(individuals in a group) for the speaker: fast or slow, long or short. (The devel-
oped experimental technique has become a widely accepted research paradigm.) 
First, it turned out that the pack responds to calls not only when their sender 
(individual) is present (see), and not only when their context (predator) is pre-
sent (remains within the reach of the senses), which clearly emphasizes their 
purely communicative (signal) nature. Second, it turned out that manipulating 
the acoustic spectrum in the expressive (affective) parameters of the message 
(the sender’s communicative action) does not change the reference (declarative) 
parameters of behavior (the recipient’s non-communicative response). To sum 
up, it was found that the variable in the message is the emotional component, 
and the constant is the informational component.21
Second, it was found in the social interaction of some mammals (monkeys) 
that the sender is often a younger male (mother’s son), and the recipient – the 
eldest female (the son’s mother). It was found that messages included social 
signals that are transmitted and received in the context of threats (antagonism 
in the pack), while these signals are structurally and functionally different, 
depending on who was attacking and how, on the one hand, the status of the 
aggressor, for example, the position of high or low (in relation to the pack), close 
or distant relationship (in relation to the victim), and, on the other hand, the 
scale of the conflict, for instance, physical or acoustic aggression. Social mes-
sages contain voice signals, such as undulating, noisy, sparkling, pulsating, and 
tonal (in short: several hundred [561] screams were recorded, and divided into 
several [5] classes). By the way, it turned out that if the sender (son) stimulates, 
then the recipient (mother) reacts, where: her reaction is proportional to the 
stimulation: either minimal, cf. the mother’s cry distracts the aggressor from 
her son (absorption), or maximum, cf. the mother’s action restrains the aggres-
sor’s attack on her son (retorsion), where the mother’s reaction is always faster 
 21 Thomas T. Struhsaker, “Auditory Communication among Vervet Monkeys (Cercopithecus 
aethiops),” in Social Communication Among Primates, ed. Simon Altmann (New York: University 
of Chicago Press, 1967), 281–324; Robert M. Seyfarth, Dorothy L. Cheney, and Peter Marler, 
“Vervet Monkey Alarm Calls: Semantic Communication in a  Free-ranging Primate,” Animal 





















and stronger when the son calls for help than when someone else calls for 
help. Social communication includes, on the one hand, communicative stimuli 
(mother-son communication) and, on the other hand, (non-)communicative 
reactions (mother-son response), where it is possible that social messages convey 
information about the stimulus (about the victim and the aggressor) and/or at-
titudes to the reaction (for the defender and the aggressor).22
Third, it has been found that copulatory communication in some mammals 
(monkeys and macaques) occurs in such a  way that a  female communicates 
with a  male (both with her partner and his rival) so that during copulation it 
signals whether or not sperm ejaculation has taken place. In other words, the 
female transmits one communication when copulation ends with ejaculation, 
and a  second message when copulation does not end with ejaculation. Thus, 
the female sends a  communication (about the result of mating: its success or 
failure), which concerns whether the copulation was successful (positive for the 
partner and negative for the rival) or not (negative for the partner and positive 
for the rival), increasing her chances of conceiving offspring (either from her 
partner or from his rival). Females want to mate with all males, which allows 
spermatozoa to compete in the sexual pathways and thus maximize the best 
genetic recombination. There are several hypotheses that try to explain copu-
latory communication (female screams), such as notification about the fertile 
phase, encouraging males to compete, regulating male ejaculation, signaling 
the right to males.23
Fourth, it has been established that the alarm and food communication 
of some birds (hens) is carried out in such a  way that the male transmits the 
message, and the female receives it. Alarm messages from hens are transmit-
ted and received in the context of a  threat of attack: from above (a  bird), for 
example, a  hawk, or from below (a  mammal), for instance, a  fox, where the 
male transmits alarm messages more often in the presence of relatives (natural 
selection). The food communications of hens are transmitted and received in 
the context of food with information about the taste. The best, for example, 
powdery mildew larvae or the worst, for instance, peanut shells, while the male 
often transmits food messages in the presence of females (sexual selection). 
In summary, birds communicate with each other in terms of their life needs, 
exchanging at least four communications, that is, two for alarm and two for 
food. It is important to note that signaling in birds is characterized by signal 
 22 Harold Gouzoules and Sarah Gouzoules, “Design Features and Developmental 
Modification of Pigtail Macaque, Macaca nemestrina, Agonistic Screams,” Animal Behaviour 37 
(1989): 383–401.
 23 Dana Pfefferle et al., “Female Barbary Macaque (Macaca sylvanus) Copulation Calls Do 
Not Reveal the Fertile Phase But Influence Mating Outcome,” Proceedings of the Royal Society 
B: Biological Sciences 275, no. 1634 (2008): 571–578.
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specialization (depending on the context) and relativization of communication 
(depending on the recipient).24
Let me remind you that the main research problem in biosemantics takes 
the form of a question: Is signaling in the animal world indexable or symbolic? 
There have been several observations and several experiments that seem to shed 
some light on this question.
First, an experiment was conducted in which the researcher (human) pre-
sented the subject (chimpanzee) with signs (two types: small and large) and 
food (two portions: small and large), while the demonstration of signs and/
or food assumed, first of all, that food is not a sign (primary agreement) and, 
second, food is a  sign (secondary agreement); in any event, the sign (either 
non-food or food) and food entered into a relationship in which the elements 
of the sign remained: signified and signifier. The experiment was successful. 
The animal would first reach for the sign representing a larger portion of food 
to get a  larger portion of food, and then the animal would reach for the sign 
representing a smaller portion of food to get a larger portion of food. In other 
words, the animal understood the original agreement (in both versions, cf. ex-
planations: a lot for a lot and a lot for a little), while the animal, processing the 
problem, most likely, was guided by its cognitive abilities, cf. inference about 
the modus ponens ponendo scheme: “If (in the past) I  chose X, I  got food Y 
(first premise), and if (in the future) I choose X (second premise), I will get Y 
(output).” Second, the animal reached for a larger portion of food to get a large 
portion of food, and did not reach for a smaller portion of food to get a larger 
portion of food (the animal does not understand the secondary agreement in 
which the food sign is associated with food objects); the animal reached for 
a  larger portion of food to eat it. The animal did not understand that one 
portion of food (resp. small or large) symbolizes (according to the secondary 
agreement) the second portion of food (resp. large or small), and therefore, 
by reaching for a smaller portion of food, it would provide itself with a  larger 
portion of food. Other experimental animals (primates and hominids) behaved 
similarly. This example shows that animals (chimpanzees) do not understand 
the nature of the symbol.25
Second, it has been observed that a  linguistically trained pygmy chimpan-
zee, Kanzi, transmits messages that create combinations of signals (lexigrams), 
 24 Peter Marler, Alfred Dufty, and Roberta Pickert, “Vocal Communication in the Domestic 
Chicken I: Does a  Sender Communicate Information about the Quality of a  Food Referent to 
a  Receiver?” Animal Behaviour 34 (1986a): 188–194; Peter Marler, Alfred Dufty, and Roberta 
Pickert, “Vocal Communication in the Domestic Chicken II: Is a Sender Sensitive to the Presence 
and Nature of a Receiver,” Animal Behaviour 34 (1986b): 194–198.
 25 Sara T. Boysen, Gary G. Bernston, Mary B. Hannan, and John T. Cacioppo, “Quantity-
based Interference and Symbolic Representations in Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes),” Journal of 





















where: the relationships between the message signals correspond to the rela-
tionships between the objects of the situation, namely, the order of one map 
(isomorphically maps) the order of others, which proves that animals can com-
municate using iconic messages, cf. communication: grab pat (≠pat grab) and 
pat grab (≠grab grab), in which the first lexigram denotes an earlier action, and 
the second – a  later action. How do we know that there is an iconic (co)rela-
tion between signs and states? It turns out that when the recipient (a  human) 
performs actions in a  sequence identical to that provided in the communica-
tion, the sender (animal) reacts approvingly, and when the recipient (a human) 
performs actions in the opposite order to that predicted by the message, the 
sender (animal) reacts disapprovingly. This example shows that some animals 
(chimpanzees) understand the essence of icons (in any case, iconic signs are 
quite common in nature, cf. the phenomenon of mimicry).26
Moreover, the aforementioned conclusion is supported by a newer interpreta-
tion of older observations. Let me remind you that in the first half of the 20th 
century, observations were made on bees, and in the second half of the 20th 
century, experiments were conducted on models of bees, thanks to which it 
was found that bees report, among other things, the distance to be overcome 
and the direction they should follow to find food (nectar). Food rituals occur 
in such a way that the bee leaves the hive, goes to investigate, finds food, takes 
a  sample, returns to the hive and begins to dance, completing a  movement(s) 
in its entirety and parts (wings and abdomen) of its body, so that it transmits 
messages in channels: tactile and acoustic. The dancing insect reports the dis-
tance (near or far) and the direction (left or right) in which the swarm should 
go in search of food. There are two types of dances that guarantee the bees the 
correct location of food: the first dance, which resembles the number zero (0), 
and the second dance, which resembles the number eight (8). The first dance 
signals that food is nearby (0 < 100 m) in a  horizontal direction. The second 
dance signals that food is far away (> 100 m > 13,000 m) in a horizontal direc-
tion, which indicates the angle between the dance and the Sun. It is important 
to note that dance communication is based on at least two correlations: between 
the tempo of the dance individuals in the hive and distance from the hive to the 
food and between the corner of the dance individuals in the hive, the angle of 
the Sun above the hive, and the direction from the hive to food (between the 
rhythm of the dance of the individual in the hive and the energy spent on the 
flight from the hive to the food?). These correlations are par excellence iconic, 
among other things, they are based on the metaphor: “the more form, the more 
 26 Patricia M. Greenfield and Sue E. Savage-Rumbaugh, “Imitation, Grammatical 
Development, and the Invention of Protogrammar by an Ape,” in Biological and Behavioral 
Determinants of Language Development, ed. Norman Krasnegor, Duane Rumbaugh, Richard 
Schiefelbusch, and Michael Studdert-Kennedy (Hillsdale: Psychology Press, 1991), 235–258.
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content,” cf. iconic communications in human language: He walked and walked 
and walked = He walked a  looong way.27
It should be added that the acquisition (study) and processing (use) of sym-
bols and non-symbols includes other brain chains, namely: symbolic (and some 
iconic) signs have a prefrontal location, and indicative (and some iconic) signs 
have a non-frontal location.28
2.1.2.2. Interpretations
There is no doubt that during communication animals transmit quantitative 
information to each other, that is, information as a  decrease in entropy, and 
probably qualitative information, that is, information as a representation of the 
situation. The results of at least several studies (observations and experiments) 
lead to the conclusion that there are at least several species of birds and mam-
mals that have at least some signals that relate to at least several domains, and 
therefore communicate (with signals) that are transmitted and received in the 
context of: (for) threats, such as alarm, and (for) invitations, such as food.
From the point of view of a  semantic interpretation of the communicative 
function, there are two hypotheses: (neo)cognitive (maximalist) and (neo)be-
havioral (minimalist), where: the first hypothesis is that animals in their com-
munications (signals) represent (declaratively and informatively) some attributes 
of stimuli, and the second hypothesis is that animals organize (imperatively and 
emotionally) some aspects of the reaction in their communications (signals). It 
is likely that both interpretations are correct to some extent, where: in the world 
of non-human animals, the imperative is placed in the foreground (the goal), 
and the declarative is placed in the background (in the center). It is possible 
that people live in the world of declarations, whereas animals – in the world of 
demands. Sign communications sent and received by living organisms perform 
several functions, of which one is the main and the other is secondary. Animals 
communicate with each other by sending and receiving communications that 
have a  function: on the one hand (primary), expressive or impressive, and on 
the other hand (secondary), referential. In this approach, the expressive (lower) 
or impressive (higher) function is the figure (center) of the communication, 
and the referential function is its background (periphery). (It is noteworthy 
that in human languages, unlike animal codes, there are words that perform 
a  function: not only semantic, but also grammatical and pragmatic.) In this 
approach, signals and communications in the animal world are assigned the 
attribute (largest) of functional reference, namely, animals respond to the physi-
 27 Karl von Frisch, The Dance Language and Orientation of Bees (Cambridge: Belknap 
Press, 1967); Axel Michelsen, Wolfgand H. Kirchner, and Martin Lindauer, “Honeybees Can 
Be Recruited by a Mechanical Model of Dancing Bee,” Naturwissenschaften 76 (1989): 277–280.
 28 Dillion Niederhut, “Gesture and the Origin of Language,” in Proceedings of the 10th 
International Conference (EVOLANG 10), ed. Christine Cuskley et al. (Singapore: Evolang 12 





















cal (diacritical) and mental (semantic) features of the communication (signals), 
so that they encode information about (i.e., the minimum) several attributes 
of a predator: first, the predator’s genus, that is, the type of organisms, second, 
the predator’s locus, including: direction: above or below; distance: far or near, 
and; in addition: degree and mode, that is, the level of alarm: high or low and 
the source of information: acoustic or optical. The problem, however, is that 
in groups of birds and mammals, it has been observed that one individual 
transmits an alarm or food communication, even if the second individual is in 
the same place as the first, and, like the first individual, perceives a  threat or 
food and, like the first individual, sends an alarm or food signal. Evidently, in 
a situation where the first and second individuals know the same thing, the first 
one cannot have informational intentions in relation to the second individual. 
Thus, it is possible that, for instance, anxious communication boils down to an 
individual disturbing the pack (goal: concentration of forces) and/or the preda-
tor (goal: presentation of forces).29
It is assumed that at least some species of bird and mammal communities 
have a  repertoire of signals that, as part of their communications, belong to 
certain classes of contextual phenomena. In other words, the sender adapts 
the code to the context, distributing portions of information and emotions 
depending on many different factors. It is important to note that signals in the 
animal world perform the following functions: general or specific, for example, 
general alarms and food signals are given and received in the context of a threat 
or food “in general” and specific alarms and food signals – in the context of 
a  threat or food “in particular.” First, the alarms are stimuli and/or reactions 
that are associated with the threat, and which may threaten the recipient, and 
to the behavior which the recipient must follow where: information about the 
stimulus refers to the direction (top or bottom) and attack distance (large or 
small) attacking and susceptibility to response direction (up or down) of salva-
tion and a  means (fast or slow) to escape. Second, food cues refer to stimuli 
and/or reactions that relate to the food the recipient can find and the behavior 
the recipient must implement, where: information about the stimulus refers to 
the quantity (more or less) and quality (better or worse) of the food and the 
predisposition to the reaction – the direction (right or left) and distance (near 
and far) to the goal, cf. the famous (iconic!) dance of the bees.30 In summa-
 29 Simon W. Townsend and Marta B. Manser, “Functionally Referential Communication in 
Mammals: The Past, Present and the Future,” Ethology 119 (2013): 1–11.
 30 Interestingly enough, when an experiment was conducted in which bee food (nectar) 
was placed on a pole, it turned out that bees can neither send nor receive messages that signal 
the food is above the ground or not on the ground, because they have signals that relate to 
the horizontal, and not to the vertical dimension due to their subjective perception of the ob-
jective environment having developed in natural and not in experimental-artificial situations. 
Moreover, it has been observed that many populations of bees of the same species interpret 
signals differently: “close” and “far,” “left” and “right,” which is an argument for a  thesis that 
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tion, the semantics of animal signaling includes signs that are (to each other) 
similar in relation: hyponym and hyperonym. In other words, the hierarchy of 
creatures in the sphere of animal interests has only two levels: (more) general 
and (more) specific.
However, the most important question that needs to be resolved from the 
outset is whether signals in animal communication have the status of separate 
units from the co(n)text and in the co(n)text. Consequently, it should be checked 
that signals in animal messages do not depend on the contexts in which they 
occur, and that they are invariant in the contexts in which they appear, where: 
the term co(n)text can refer to both situations (context) that accompanies the 
signal as an independent message, and the accompanying text (co-text), attached 
to the signal as an independent message. It is assumed that signals A and B are 
constant in the contexts of X and Y regardless of contexts X and Y, provided 
that they satisfy the proportions in terms of paradigmatics and syntagmatics: 
AX/BY = AX/BY, cf. black crow/white sheep = white crow/black sheep, where the 
words: crow and sheep are animal names, and black crow/white sheep ≠ white 
crow/black sheep, where the words crow and sheep are not animal names (of 
course, in the first situation we are dealing with lexemes: white, black; crow, 
sheep, and in the second situation – with phraseological units: white crow, black 
sheep). The paradigmatic and syntagmatic relation (together): AX/BY = AX/BY 
can be divided into (separate) proportions: paradigmatic: AX/BX = AY/BY and 
syntagmatic: AX/AY = BX/BY, so we can assume that: signals: A  and B are 
independent of contexts: X and Y as long as they correspond to the proportion 
in paradigmatic terms: AX/BX = AY/BY, and signals: A  and B are invariant in 
contexts: X and Y as long as they satisfy proportions in the syntagmatic plane: 
AX/AY = BX/BY.
It turns out that messages (signals) sent and received by animals remain 
closely (inextricably) connected to the contexts (objects) in which they appear 
(to which they refer). For instance, while a person can relate the word eagle to 
various objects, cf. eagle as “a specific (one or certain) individual or abstract (set 
or set) species” and, accordingly, pronounces (about an eagle or eagles) different 
things (at different times and in different places), the animal will only use the 
eagle signal in the context of a threat from this predator (here and now).31 The 
context of human messages is abstract and unstable, and the context of animal 
bees only transmit what is happening “now” and “here,” where the categories “now” and “here” 
can encompass human hours and kilometers.
 31 This is somewhat similar to a  situation where there are some peculiar (!) expressions of 
natural language. For instance, a paremia (proverb or saying) that is expressed only under pre-
cisely defined conditions, cf. the expression let the cat out of the bag, which the sender sends to 
the recipient only when “something (negative) that was hidden has become apparent.” From this 






















messages is concrete and stable, where the variability and stability of the context 
are associated with (pre)adaptation and cognitive (pre)disposition, that is, the 
ability to mentally travel through time (past and future) and space (near and 
far), and with (pre)adaptation and communicative (pre)disposition, namely, the 
ability to represent a verbal mental journey unique to humans. To summarize, 
signaling (reference) is rigid (bony) in communication with animals and flex-
ible (elastic) in human communication. Thanks to special linguistic means, cf. 
qualifier (existential and general) and operator (descriptive and abstract), hu-
mans can relate words to various objects in various ways, cf. the phenomenon 
of assumption, for example, material and normal, including personal (in relation 
to an individual) and universal (in relation to a  species).
2.1.3. Biogrammatical discoveries
The main problem of biogrammatics research takes the form of two alternative 
questions: first, is the construct that the sign is associated with (only) linear or 
(also) structural, and second, is there a phonotactic or syntactic combination that 
can be found in the animal world?
There have been many observations and many experiments conducted that 
shed light on how animals (other than humans) process messages on a  bio-
grammatical level.
Biogrammatics describes complex communication: internal and external, 
namely, built communicates: monologue, cf. one (transmitting) complex com-
munication separately and in a  dialogue mode, cf. a  set (transmission and 
reception) of simple messages, where in a  monologically complex communica-
tion the second signal changes the first signal, and in a complex dialogue com-
munication, the first signal causes the second signal.32 In the future, the work 
focuses exclusively on monologically complex communications as the closest 
grammatical equivalents of combinations in human languages.
The results of the research show the messages that mammals and birds 
transmit and receive have a certain degree of internal formal complementation.
First, it has been observed that some mammals (tamarins) exchange com-
munications that show some degree of internal complementarity, especially 
in a  situation where two groups meet: one’s own and another’s. It turned out 
that in a  situation where two groups meet each other, males and females in 
both groups approach and receive complex messages, a  combination of simple 
 32 An example of dialogically complex communication is the stickleback mating ritual, 
which consists of several stages (adjacent pairs), parts of which are optional and non-permutable. 
Cf. First, the male shows the female his lower abdomen. Second, the male zigzags to the nest, 
and the female (in response) follows him. Third, the male raises his mouth up, and the female 
(in response) follows the male. Fourth, the male lets the female into the nest, and the female (in 
response) slips into the nest. Fifth, the male pushes the female with his mouth, and the female 
(in response) lays eggs. See Niko Tinbergen, Instinktlehre (Berlin and Hamburg: P. Parey, 1952).
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signals, see the signals: “alarm” and “relaxation,” which appear (separately) in 
the context of approaching (alarm) and removing (relaxation) a  predator. For 
instance, if the distance that separates both groups is large (perceptually), males 
and females vocalize the first communication, and if the distance that sepa-
rates both groups is small (escalating), males and females vocalize the second 
communication. Both the first and second communication are complex; the 
first communication is smaller, and the second communication is larger. The 
first message combines two signals: anxious “emotional tension” and soothing 
“emotional relaxation.” The first communication is given (separately) by males 
and females, and: individuals of both sexes give two versions of the first com-
munication, that is, males – the male version and females – the female version. 
The second communication, in turn, combines two versions of the first com-
munication: male and female. The second communication is sent (jointly) by 
males and females, while individuals of both sexes transmit one version of the 
second communication, that is, the male-female version.33
Second, it has been observed that some mammals (chimpanzees) formulate, 
on the one hand, a dozen more types of innate than individually learned (long-
range) communications that resemble the following: giggling, grunting, gasping, 
humming, coughing, shouting, squeaking, whining, and barking, and, on the 
other hand, a dozen or so more individually learned than innate (short-range) 
messages that affect their body (kinestics) and voice (vocalist), face (facial ex-
pressions) and hands (gestures). Communications combine acoustic and optical 
signals in about half, with a slight predominance of optical signals, resulting in 
their combinations (no more than 10% of the body, cf. 375 observed messages 
of pygmy chimpanzees and 383 observed messages of chimpanzees). Moreover, 
chimpanzees modify signals in such a  way that, for instance, the signal reper-
toire refers to activity (threat and food), and the body of communication refers 
to the properties (quality and quantity) of activity (threat and food).34
In connection with everything that has been discussed above, it can be as-
sumed that at least some animal species use communication that has a certain 
degree of internal formal complementation.
2.1.3.1. Linear Combinations: Observations and Interpretations
The results of the research conducted show the messages that mammals and 
birds transmit and receive have a  certain degree of internal linear complemen-
tation.
First, observations and experiments were made to establish that the order of 
notes in syllables, syllables in motifs, and motifs in the songs of certain birds 
 33 Joseph Cleveland and Charles T. Snowdon, “The Complex Vocal Repertoire of the Adult 
Cotton-top Tamarin (Saguinus oedippus),” Zeitschrift fur Tierpsychologie 58 (1982): 231–270.
 34 Amy S. Pollick and Frans B. M. de Waal, “Ape Gestures and Language Evolution,” 





















(brown-headed cowbird) is not random, but predictive and, as such, subject to 
certain linear restrictions. It turned out that if the male transmits a  natural 
communication: linear-canonical, a  female, on receiving the notice, takes up 
a  sexual position (result of observation), and if the experimenter plays the ar-
tificial communication: linear-inversive, that is, communication processed by 
the experimenter for research purposes, a  female, after receiving this message, 
does not take up a  sexual pose, and, moreover, does not respond to it (result 
of experiment).35
Second, observations were made that some birds (tits) approach and receive 
messages that remain in connection with the contexts of threats (from a preda-
tor) and invitations (to a partner), with the male playing the role of the sender 
and the female playing the role of the recipient. If the sender sends a message 
(ABC) to the recipient that includes the first (emergency) signal, the recipient 
looks around the sender, and if the sender sends the recipient a  message (D) 
containing the second (paired) signal, the recipient initiates movement in the 
direction of the sender. An experiment was conducted that consisted of mes-
sages containing alarms and mating signals being recorded and, first, recreated 
in a  natural form: ABC + D, and, second, processed in an artificial form: D + 
ABC. It turned out that in the first situation, the recipient responded adequately 
to the signals, and did not respond to them at all in the second situation. Thus, 
it was found that there is a  linear proportion between the parts of the com-
munication and the context, between the sender’s stimuli and the recipient’s 
responses, namely: “ABC” and “D” in the communication stimulus correspond 
to “ABC” and “D” in the context of a  response.36
Hence, we can assume that at least some animal species use a  linear gram-
mar that satisfies the concatenation condition: ~ (AB = BA).
2.1.3.2. Idiomatic Combinations: Observations and Interpretations
The results of the study show the messages that mammals and birds transmit 
and receive have a  certain degree of internal idiomatic complementation.
First, observations and experiments have been made showing that some 
mammals (capuchins) transmit and receive communications that are inherently 
complex: both linearly (disjunction or signal conjunction), when two signals 
(A, B) transmitted in a  particular context (X) are received as two messages 
(A and/or B), and idiomatically (signal concatenation), when two signals (A, B) 
transmitted in a  different context (Y) are received as one communication (C). 
In other words, in one situation, two communication stimuli (“A” and “B”) gen-
erate (proportionally) two non-communicative responses (“A” and “B”), and in 
 35 Laurene Ratcliffe and Ronald Weisman, “Phrase Order Recognition by Brown Headed 
Cowbirds,” Animal Behaviour 35 (1987): 1260–1262.
 36 Toshitaka N. Suzuki, David Wheatcroft, and Michael Griesser, “Experimental Evidence 
for Compositional Syntax in Bird Calls,” Nature Communications 7 (2016): 10986.
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another, two communication stimuli (“A” and “B”) generate (disproportionately) 
one non-communicative response (“C”).37
Second, it has been observed that some mammals (monkeys) transmit and 
receive messages that either convey a  threat from a  predator (from the air or 
from the ground), or a call to roam (in search of food or shelter), where the role 
of the sender is played by a  higher male, and the role of the recipient – a  sec-
ondary pack. More specifically, it was found the dominant subject transmits 
acoustic signals (A, B) that it voices in different contexts (X, Y), individually or 
together. In the first case, the communicators belong to an “alien” sphere and 
send out (on the principle: each signal separately) an alarm caused by the pres-
ence of a predator (genus and locus) that attacks from below (A). For instance, 
a mammal (cat: leopard), or from above (B), for example, a bird (eagle: crowned 
eagle). In the second case, the messages relate to one’s “own” and announce (on 
the principle: all signals together) movement initiated by the pack (AB) in search 
of food (at an early hour) or sleep (at a late hour). In other words, two identical 
signals (A, B) in different contexts (X, Y) express different content depending 
on whether they appear in the communications separately (in the context of 
a threat) or together (in the context of movement), thus: old structures (initially 
contradicting each other, cf. AB “threat from above” ^ “threat from below”) 
have, thanks to concatenation, new functions (in the second place consistent, 
cf. with AB the “search for food [in the morning]” or the ”search for food [in 
the evening”]) which fully corresponds to what is called an idiom.38
Therefore, we can assume that at least some animal species use idiomatic 
grammar, that is, formally combinational, but not functionally compositional, 
cf. condition: AB ≠ B & “AB” ≠ “A” + “B,” for example, white crow (lexical 
unit): white crow ≠ crow & “white crow” ≠ “white” + “crow,” but non-syntactic 
grammar, that is, formally combinational and functionally compositional, cf. 
condition: AB = B & “AB” = “A” + “B,” for example, black crow (grammatical 
construction): black crow = crow & “black crow” = “black” + “crow.”
2.1.3.3. Structural Combinations: Observations and Interpretations
The results of the study suggest that messages sent and received by mammals 
and birds have a  certain degree of structural complexity, where: this complica-
tion is more morphotactic than syntactic, which seems important, since the pro-
cessing of morphotactic combinations describes “finite state grammars” – FSG 
(with the strength of a weaker “regular grammar” – RG) and the processing of 
syntactic combinations – PSG – “phrase structure grammar” (with the strength 
of stronger CFG – “context-free grammars”).
 37 John G. Robinson, “Syntactic Structures in the Vocalizations of Wedge-capped Capuchin 
Monkeys, Cebus olivaceus,” Behaviour 90 (1984): 46–79.
 38 Kate Arnold and Klaus Zuberbühler, “Language Evolution: Semantic Combinations in 





















First, it was found that some mammals (guenons) communicate in such 
a  way that a  message, which is a  complex combination of simple signals, con-
sists of a  root and an affix (suffix), whereby the content of a  formally fixed 
affix changes (generalizes) the content of a  formally variable root. The study 
was conducted in a  manner that, first, observations were made, and second, 
experiments were conducted, for example, researchers (people) presented the 
subjects (animals) with optical and acoustic stimuli, namely, a  mannequin 
and samples of (non-)predatory (non-)mammals and (non-)birds, and then 
recorded their reaction. Over the course of the study, a  repertoire of several 
signals was extracted from the body of many messages, including one autono-
mous signal (acoustically low and constant): [boom] and several heteronomous 
signals (acoustically high and variable: rise or fall): simple, such as [hok] and 
[krak], and complex, such as [hok-oo] and [krak-oo]. It turned out that gue-
nons, using simple signals, send and receive complex messages in the context 
of larger and smaller threats, where: first, large threats are associated with 
physical factors, such as a  falling tree or a  falling branch, see [boom], and 
with biotic factors, such as a  threat from an eagle, see [hok], or a  threat flying 
in the air, other than an eagle, see [hok-oo], and a  threat from a  leopard, see 
[krak], or a  threat running on the ground, other than a  leopard, see [krak-oo]; 
second, less hazards are associated with the presence of other organisms: both 
non-marmosets and marmosets, that is, separate (contiguous) individuals and 
multiple (competing) groups. In other words, in messages that signal a greater 
threat, the affix (suffix) transforms the root (core) so that specific content, 
for instance, “greater threat from a  (non-)predator: from above, from the air, 
or from below, from the ground,” see message pairs: [hok] and [hok-oo] and 
[krak] and [krak-oo] where the segments: [hok-] and [krak-] are special ker-
nels, and the segment: [-oo] is a  common suffix. It is important to note that 
the information provided by elements and affixes varies depending on which 
population and which (sub)species use them, see krak “special risk: leopard” 
(in the Ivory Coast) and krak “general risk” (in Sierra Leone), while in differ-
ent countries, populations and (sub)species, different predators pose a  threat: 
not just eagles (in the Ivory Coast for Campbell’s mona monkeys), and only 
eagles (in Sierra Leone, for Diana monkeys).39
Second, it was found that some mammals (Callicebinae) encode information 
in their messages about the type (genus) of the predator and the direction of 
its attack (locus), where: information about the species is present in a  message 
that consists of a  single, and information about the direction – in a  message 
consisting of more than one signal. The study was carried out in the following 
manner: observations and experiments were conducted, for example, research-
 39 Karim Ouattara, Alban Lemasson, and Klaus Zuberbühler, “Campbell’s Monkeys 
Concatenate Vocalizations into Context-specific Call Sequences,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 106, no. 51 (2009): 22026–22031.
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ers (people) presented optical stimuli to subjects (animals), that is, models 
of predatory mammals and birds, and then recorded their reaction. First, it 
was observed that mammals (animals) have at least two signals (A, B) united 
in communications in a  combination by which animals report a  threat from 
predators: birds (A) that attack from above, from the air (a  threat from the air 
or a  tree), and mammals (B) that attack from below, from the ground (ground 
threat). Second, an experiment was conducted in which researchers (humans) 
presented the subjects (animals) with a predator dummy. In a natural situation, 
a bird dummy was placed in a tree and a mammal dummy on the ground, and 
in an artificial setting, a bird dummy on the ground and a mammal dummy in 
a tree. After seeing a (fictitious) bird in a tree and a (fictitious) mammal on the 
ground in a natural setting, the animals reacted by transmitting the following 
messages: An (for a bird in a tree) and Bn (for a mammal on the ground). After 
seeing a  (fictitious) bird on the ground and a  (fictitious) mammal in a  tree in 
an artificial setting, the animals reacted by transmitting the following messages: 
AnB – with iteration A  (for a  bird on the ground) and B n A  – with iteration 
B (for a mammal in a  tree).40
The observed facts are explained using several competing hypotheses: both 
quantitative and qualitative, as well as stronger and weaker.
The quantitative (statistical and probabilistic) hypothesis states that the pro-
portion of signals in a message correlates with the severity of the attack, strictly 
depending on where the victim and the predator, for example, a bird in a  tree 
(A  n) and a  land mammal (B n), there is a  greater threat than a  bird on the 
ground (A  n B) and a  mammal in a  tree (B n A). In this approach, the first 
component, more numerous (foreground?), signals the predator’s genus, and 
the second, less numerous (foreground?) the component is the predator’s locus.
The qualitative (algebra-logical) hypothesis, in turn, has two versions: 
a  stronger and a  weaker one. The stronger (grammatical) version of the quali-
tative hypothesis states that messages sent and received by animals are formal 
combinations of forms and functional compositions of the signal content: A and 
B, which are characterized by a certain degree of structural complexity, cf. con-
dition: ~ (AB ≠ A  ≠ B). According to this version, animals encode the genus 
and locus of the predator in their messages, where: information about the type 
of predator in relation to information about the direction of its attack is either 
higher or lower, cf. hypothetical construction, see: AB = A  ≠ B or BA = B ≠ 
A, or coordinates – compare the paratactic structure: AB = A = B or BA = B = 
A. In the first (hypothetical) approach, the message AnB “threat from a  land-
bird” consists of the main idea A  (the bird) and a subordinate one B (land), cf. 
AB = A  ≠ B, and the communication BnA  “threat from a  mammal on a  tree” 
 40 Philippe Schlenker, Emmanuel Chemla, Cristiane Cäsar, Robin Ryder, and Klaus 
Zuberbühler, “Titi Semantics: Context and Meaning in Titi Monkey Call Sequences,” Natural 





















consists of the main idea B (mammal) and a  subordinate one A  (on a  tree), cf. 
BA = B ≠ A. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find other convincing facts that 
support this very strong hypothesis. In the second (paratactic) approach, the 
communication A  n B “large threat (if) above and smaller (if) on the ground” 
consists of the previous A part (large threat (if) above) and the subsequent B part 
(smaller threat (if) land); see AB = A = B, and the communication BnA  “large 
threat (if) on the ground and lesser threat (if) from above” consists of the pre-
ceding B part (large (if) threat on land) and subsequent A  part (lesser threat 
(if) from above), cf. BA = B = A). We may note that paratactic constructs are 
within the computational capacity of animals. It has been observed that Kanzi, 
a  linguistically trained bonobo, transmits communications that coordinate 
combinations of signals (lexigrams), where relationships between communica-
tive signals correspond to relationships between objects in a  situation based 
on conjunction, cf. communications: grab pat (“first grab me, then pat me”) 
and pat grab (“first pat me, then grab me”), in which the first part denotes an 
earlier action and the second denotes a  later action. Therefore, it is possible 
that paratactic structures (coordinations) in the communication of non-human 
animals may be comparable due to their equal degree of complication. Finally, 
a weaker (lexical) version of the qualitative hypothesis states that messages sent 
and received by animals are neither grammatical combinations of forms, nor 
semantic compositions of the content of the signals A and B. Specifically, in an 
artificial situation, for example, a  bird dummy on the ground and a  mammal 
dummy on a tree, animals that are unable to recognize and/or name the type of 
threat (decision conflict regarding the choice of a semantically adequate signal: 
A  or B) alternate between signaling a  threat from a  bird and from a  mammal. 
It is possible that “new situations” for “old signals” act as evolutionary catalysts, 
as new functions emerge from old structures. The observed conflict may be an 
artificial simulation of a natural process.
Regardless of which hypothesis, in actuality, best explains the facts, gram-
matical combinations arise from strong selective pressure on them, cf. first, the 
advantage of acoustic messages over optical messages (for example, due to the 
fact that it is easier to hear in the forest than to see), and, second, the advan-
tage of complex messages over simple ones (for example, due to wide variety 
in the number and types of predators). The combination, first of all, enhances 
the informational power of the code. In particular, it makes information more 
abundant and accurate. Moreover, a  combination is a  grammatical tool, using 
which mammals and birds, with a  small repertoire of semantic signals, form 
a  large number of pragmatic communications. Specifically, the connection be-
tween the signal in the code and the signal in the communication is that the 
signal in the code (for abstract species) refers to a  state in context in a  rigid 
manner, and a  signal in a  message (for a  particular person as sender and/or 
recipient) refers to a  state in context in a  flexible manner.
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Consequently, it is possible to formulate a hypothesis according to which at 
least some species of animals use a  morphotactic grammar (its certain primi-
tive form), that is, something in between phonotactic and syntactic grammars.
2.1.3.4. Iterative Combinations: Linear and Structural
This study’s results show that messages that mammals and birds transmit and 
receive have an iterative-linear (reduplicative) complication, but do not have an 
iterative-structural (recursive) complication (or, at least, this has not yet been 
convincingly proven).
Among other things, it has been observed that some birds (tits) transmit and 
receive messages that are characterized by at least a  certain degree of formal 
complication, and, moreover, the recorded complication of messages has signs 
of linear iteration. Thus, first, a  corpus was formed: several thousand (3,500) 
communications were recorded, of which several hundred (362) combinations 
were extracted. Second, the code was restored. It includes vocabulary – several 
(4) segments, cf. four notes: A, B, C, D, and grammar  – two patterns, cf. two 
rules: A(n)D(n) and B(n)C(n), where diagrams define the sequence of segments, 
including their quality and quantity. Above all, however, rule schemas imply 
a  potentially infinite repetition of the notes in syllables and therefore a  poten-
tially infinite amount of information in sequences. The term information refers 
here to quantity, not quality.41
Although they have a  small number of signals in their repertoire, animals 
create a  large number of messages in the corpus, especially combinations that 
include at least two signals, and, in particular, sequences that order at least two 
signals. However, there are critical differences in the combinatorial domains of 
human and non-human animals. In particular, humans transmit and receive 
messages that are grammatical (syntactic) combinations and semantic (propo-
sitional) compositions, cf. a sentence consists of words, where a sentence refers 
to the state of affairs and words refer to things, while animals transmit and 
receive messages that are grammatical (phonotactic and possibly morphotactic, 
but not syntactic) combinations, but not semantic (propositional) compositions, 
cf. sounds, where a  word refers to the state of affairs, but sounds do not refer 
to things. However, above all, man is capable of transmitting and receiving 
a  finite number of signals (words and their meanings), which can carry an 
infinite amount of information (proposals and judgments about them). The 
communicative, mathematical and psychological basis of infinite operations is 
recursion, or structural iteration (inclusive iteration). It is realized only in the 
syntactic area (for example, grandfather (whom – grandfather)…n and grand-
mother (whom – grandmother)n…; grandfather knows that (grandmother knows 
 41 Jack P. Hailman, Millicent S. Ficken, and Robert W. Ficken, “The ‘chick-a-dee’ Call of 
Parus atricapillus: A Recombinant System of Animal Communication Compared with Written 





















that grandfather knows…)n p; grandfather, who (knows grandmother, who knows 
grandfather, …)n p.
Mathematical and linguistic studies demonstrate that phonotactic and mor-
photactic processing – for example, of sounds in particles and particles in 
words  – requires a  grammar that is no weaker or stronger than RG: for ex-
ample, FSG. Meanwhile syntactic and transphrastic processing – for example, 
words in sentences and sentences in texts – require grammars that are no 
weaker or stronger than CFG: for example, PSG. Consequently, it is assumed 
that the critical difference (which outweighs the other factors) in the field of 
the grammatical combinatorics of humans and animals is (the absence of) the 
existence of syntax (recursion). Thus, experimental studies seek to strengthen 
or weaken the hypothesis of the uniqueness of syntax and recursion in human 
communication. Experimental research is focused on two issues in particular.
The first issue lies in the fact that animals (more precisely, some mammals 
and birds) process messages that generate: either ordinary grammars (RG), for 
example, finite state grammars (FSG), which describe linear relationships be-
tween predecessors and successors in sequences, or contextual free grammars 
(CFG), such as the phrase structure grammar (PSG), which describe structural 
relationships between the principal and subordinate elements in constructions. 
In other words, the first problem deals with the question of whether the 
respondent follows linear or structural, phonotaxic, or syntactic clues when 
processing the messages presented by the researcher, that is, whether he takes 
into account only the perceptual forms and positions (ante- and post-) of seg-
ments in the sequence (the local relationships of concrete elements), which are 
subject to, for example, duplication, or also takes into account understandable 
functions and the dominance of (hypo- and hyper-) segments in the structure 
(global relations of abstract classes), which, for example, are subject to recursion.
The second problem lies in the fact that animals (more precisely, some mam-
mals and birds) process messages that contain elements (segments) and their 
sets (classes), which are subject to the following operations: (only) duplication 
(linear iteration), see Z  → (XY)n or Z  → XnYn, or (also) recursion (structural 
iteration), see Z → (Z)XY(Z) or Z → X(Z)Y, where both operations generate (for 
segments A  and B), combinations that are, in the first sequence, identical, and 
in the second sequence, distinct. See, on the one hand, AB and ABAB, … for: 
Z  → (XY)n and Z  → (Z)XY(Z), and, on the other hand, AB and AABB, … for: 
Z → XnYn and Z → X(Z)Y?
The research being conducted should provide an answer to the following 
question: Does the animal extract the schema from the training corpus (mas-
tery of the grammar), and does it apply the schema to the test (grammatical 
extrapolation)? In other words, does the animal generalize the pattern? That is, 
does it transfer the learning pattern (old) to the testing pattern (new) as follows: 
different segments, like ABA and BAB, CDC and DCD, but an identical pattern, 
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such as XYX, where the schemas must follow the rules of competing formal 
grammars – FSG and PSG? In order to answer these questions, research is be-
ing carried out, which, in terms of methodology, fits into the AGL paradigm.
The AGL (artificial grammar learning) paradigm was created to make it 
possible to diagnose the grammatical (combinational) (pre)dispositions of (non-)
speaking beings, including their computational basis, that is, either algebraic-
logical constraints or statistical-probabilistic transitions.42 In experimental stud-
ies carried out in the AGL paradigm, the researcher presents stimuli to the 
person being studied, where one stimulus correlates with a  reward and the 
other does not. The research records the reactions that the person experiences, 
depending on what he knows (is able to do) and what he does not know (is un-
able to do). Experimental studies in the field of zoosemiotics deal, in particular, 
with the fact that the researcher (person) demonstrates messages to the subject 
(animal), which contain segments and diagrams. The message is formed in such 
a  way that a  diagram, for example, XYX, begins the corresponding positions, 
and the corresponding segment, such as A  and B, ends them, such that some 
messages, such as ABA and BAB, are correct (grammatical), while others, such 
as AAB and BBA, ABB and BAA, are incorrect (not grammatical). However, 
first and foremost, research consists of two stages: training and testing. The 
researcher presents to the subject, on the one hand (in the training stage), old 
messages containing old segments and old patterns, and, on the other hand (in 
the testing stage), new messages containing new segments and old patterns (or 
vice versa). Messages can include segments in either a  random order (no pat-
tern), that is, a non-grammatical order, or in a predictive order (with a template), 
that is, in a grammatical order and, moreover, one that is compatible with one 
of the few formal grammars, for example, FSG or PSG. In other words, at the 
training stage, the researcher teaches the subject, and, at the testing stage, the 
researcher checks the subject. Specifically, it is checked whether a tested pattern 
is discovered in the input data (old) and whether the pattern is carried over 
to the output data (new). It is important that one type of stimulus (message) 
 42 The AGL model was developed on the basis of psycholinguistics as a  method to experi-
mentally detect the implicit assimilation of an artificial grammar in laboratory conditions. The 
research conducted has revealed that respondents (that is, language and speech users who do 
not receive any instructions from examiners and rely only on their intuition), first, memorize 
sequences of letters in a  predictable order (in a  non-random order), which is generated by 
a certain formal grammar, and, second, they classify correct sequences generated by a particular 
formal grammar more accurately than incorrect ones (note: “better” and “more accurate” mean, 
roughly, being above the threshold of a “perfect coin toss”). Research in the AGL paradigm has 
demonstrated the primacy of the role of long-term procedural memory over declarative memory 
in the grammatical area of syntactic combinatorics, and confirms the existence of a mechanism 
for grammatical assimilation. See George A. Miller, “Free Recall of Redundant Strings of Letters,” 
Journal of Experimental Psychology 56, no. 6 (1958): 485–491; Arthur S. Reber, “Implicit Learning 





















correlates with a reward (food), while the other does not. For example, any mes-
sage containing the scheme XYX is a rewarded stimulus. We may compare: the 
messages ABA and BAB are used at the training stage, while CDC and DCD 
are used at the testing stage. If the animal answers correctly, that is, indicates 
(in some way) a stimulus, which is rewarded in anticipation of a (food) reward, 
such as drooling or moving towards the food they are expecting, it has found 
a  pattern in the input data (detection) and passed it to the output (generaliza-
tion). Moreover, the researcher predicts that the subject will not respond to 
old stimuli (habituation), but will respond to new stimuli (dishabituation) – 
provided that the subject recognizes and differentiates both of them, of course. 
Thus, by presenting stimuli and registering reactions, one can learn something 
about what the subject already knows (is able to do) and what he does not yet 
know (is unable to do), especially in the grammatical (syntactic) area.43
The AGL paradigm has assumed an important place in research on the poten-
tial mental representation of formal grammars in the animal kingdom.44 Therefore, 
the research problem undertaken in the field of zoosemiotics takes the form of 
a question: What grammar can be found in the brain of humans and animals 
(and in its many minds): a weaker or stronger one – for example, FSG or PSG?
Formal grammars: FSG and PSG occupy different positions in the hierarchy 
of formal languages (grammars and automata). FSG, like RG, occupies a  lower 
position, and PSG, like CFG, occupies a  higher one. Clearly, this is related to 
the degree of complexity of their rules with regard to, among other things, 
their quality and the quantity of symbols used in them.45 The research being 
conducted seeks to establish which rung of this grammatical ladder is occupied 
by people, and which by animals.46 This research fits into the AGL paradigm, 
especially with regard to the application of the (dis)habituation technique.
The (dis)habituation procedure, that is, habituation and dishabituation, is 
conducted such that, first, habituation to a  simpler stimulus (for example, 
a message generated by FSG) and dishabituation from a more complex stimulus 
(for example, a  message generated by PSG) are carried out. Then, habituation 
to a  more complex stimulus (such as a  PSG-generated message) and dishabitu-
ation from a  simpler stimulus (such as a  FSG-generated message) are carried 
out. In other words, the researcher (dis)habituates the subject. If (dis)habitua-
tion is successful in both directions, that means that the researcher has trained 
 43 Emmanuel M. Pothos, “Theories of Artificial Grammar Learning,” Psychological 
Bulletin  133 (2007): 227–244.
 44 Murphy A. Robin, Esther Mondragon, and Victoria A. Murphy, “Rule Learning by Rats,” 
Science 319 (2008): 1849–1851.
 45 John Hopcroft, Rajeev Motwani, and Jeffrey Ullman, Wprowadzenie do teorii automatów, 
języków i  obliczeń (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2005).
 46 Noam Chomsky, “Thee Models for the Description of Language,” IRE Transactions on 
Information Theory (1956): 113–123.
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and tested a  subject who recognizes/knows the stimuli: both the simpler and 
the more difficult one. This study has found that humans differentiate in both 
directions, while animals differentiate in either one or both ways. For example, 
on the one hand, mammals (tamarins) that are habituated to the (previously 
disclosed) messages generated by PSG did not respond to the (later disclosed) 
messages generated by FSG. On the other hand, birds (starlings) that were ac-
customed to the (previously disclosed) messages generated by a PSG responded 
to the (later disclosed) messages generated by an FSG.47
How can the results of the experiment be interpreted? The experimental re-
sults can be interpreted in two ways: more weakly or more strongly. The weaker 
hypothesis is that the subject (an animal) processes the messages presented 
by the researcher (a  human) as guided by their cognitive features (related to 
their cognitive (pre)dispositions, for example, arithmetic ones), cf. duplication 
as a  linear iteration, such as (A(n)B(n))(n). The stronger hypothesis is that the 
subject (an animal) processes the messages presented by the researcher (a  hu-
man) as guided by their linguistic characteristics (related to their linguistic 
(pre)dispositions, for example, grammatical ones), cf. recursion as a  structured 
iteration, such as C → (C)A(C)B(C). Here we may remember that the general 
methodology of science (logic) formulates a  postulate called Occam’s Razor, 
which has been interpreted in various ways based on the detailed methodology 
of science (biosemiotics). For example, Martinelli’s Canon postulates that if one 
hypothesis, a weaker one, does not explain a fact, the stronger hypothesis is ac-
cepted, and Morgan’s Canon postulates that if two hypotheses, one stronger and 
one weaker, explain one fact, then the weaker hypothesis is accepted. The results 
of the research that I have presented and commented are covered by Morgan’s 
Canon, which requires the weaker hypothesis to be accepted. Therefore, it is 
possible, and we may even state with a high degree of probability, that birds use 
not grammatical (lingual) strategies, but arithmetic (cognitive) strategies, when 
processing experimental messages. That is, they count segments (up to several 
at a  time): A and B on both extreme sides of the original sequence AB, cf. A|B, 
AA|BB, AAA|BBB, AAAA|BBBB. The situation is somewhat reminiscent of that 
with the horse Clever Hans. That is, animals have once again surprised people 
with their cunning, which allows them to resolve language problems with non-
linguistic strategies. Regardless of the results obtained and the interpretations 
adopted, this research should be continued: first, using pygmy chimpanzees (as 
the animals most similar to humans) as experimental subjects, and, second, by 
attempting to show that animals exceed the limit of several repetitions. Until 
 47 Tecumseh W. Fitch and Marc D. Hauser, “Computational Constraints on Syntactic 
Processing in a Nonhuman Primate,” Science 303 (2004): 377–380; Timothy Q. Gentner, Kimberly 
M. Fenn, Daniel Margoliash, and Howard C. Nusbaum, “Recursive Syntactic Pattern Learning 
by Songbirds,” Nature 440 (2006): 1204–1207; Michael C. Corballis, “Recursion, Language, and 





















this goal is achieved, we may claim that syntactic recursion is a  strong, purely 
human, and specifically linguistic trait.
The research problem arising in connection with the results of this study 
concerns the genesis of recursion as a defined phylogenetic (pre)adaptation and 
an ontogenetic (pre)disposition that is inherent to the natural world. There exist 
at least two hypotheses that attempt to explain the selection pressure that can 
lead to the adaptation of cumulative recursion, where the first hypothesis signals 
the relationship of recursion with the manipulation of objects (tools), and the 
second suggests the relationship of recursion with the affinity of individuals 
(kinship). Both of these hypotheses are based on the results of observations and 
experiments, and confirm the emphatic uniqueness of recursion in syntax and 
syntax in the language.
First, it has been observed that humans and animals perceive relationships 
between objects that are generally related to each other. One example is a  set 
of cups – small (A), medium (B) and large (C) –  where A  is contained in B, 
and B is contained in C. There exist several possible (combinations) of rela-
tionships between the three cups of different sizes. Manipulation of the cups 
allows a  larger or smaller number of more or less complex operations to be 
performed. We may compare the following strategies: strategy1 – from B to C 
without A (one operation), strategy2 – B to C and from A to B (two operations), 
strategy3 – from A to B and from B to C (two operations). The first strategy is 
used by adult monkeys and human children under 12 months of age, the second 
strategy is used by children under 24 months of age, and the third strategy is 
used by children over 24 months of age and adults. The results of this research 
show that recursive thinking –  that is, inclusive iteration (which is potentially 
infinite) – is a purely human domain.48
Second, it has been observed that both humans and animals perceive 
relationships between humans who are related to each other: ancestors (par-
ents, grandparents) and descendants (child, grandchild). It turns out that only 
humans are aware of the potentially infinite ladder of existence, cf. affinities 
as iterations of inclusions, for example, on the one hand, (grand-)n father and 
(grand-)n mother, and, on the other hand, (grand-)n child and (grand-)n daughter. 
In the animal kingdom, the status of a  grandparent (the father or mother of 
someone’s father or mother), or of a  grandson or granddaughter (the child of 
someone else’s child), does not exist, and there are few other roles (degrees of 
kinship) like those performed by relatives in human communities.49
 48 Patricia M. Greenfield, “Strategies Used to Combine Seriated Cups by Chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes), Bonobos (Pan paniscus), and Capuchins (Cebus apella),” Journal of Comparative 
Psychology 113 (1999): 137–148.
 49 Dorothy L. Cheney and Robert M. Seyfarth, How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind 
of Another Species (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Dorothy L. Cheney and Robert 
M. Seyfarth, Baboon Metaphysics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
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It is possible that human and non-human animals transform simple units 
into complex ones in different ways (in the synthesis and analysis mode). 
Specifically, animals combine simple units to form complex ones by virtue of 
the concatenation relation (non-recursive), and people combine simple units to 
form complex ones by virtue of the dominance relation (recursive).
Thus, it is possible to formulate the hypothesis that no known animal spe-
cies uses a  structurally and syntactically recursive grammar (in any case, no 
one has yet managed to prove this convincingly).
2.1.4. Bio-diacritical discoveries
The main problem of the study of diacritical marks takes the form of two alter-
native questions: Is the substrate that the sign is associated with (only) segmental 
or (also) prosodic? Does there exist an impulsive or volitional transmission that 
can be found in the animal kingdom?
2.1.4.1. Observations
There have been many observations and many experiments conducted that shed 
light on how animals (other than humans) process messages on a biodiacritical 
level.
Let us compare the operations and processes. Transmission (synthesis) and 
reception (analysis) in human and non-human animals demonstrate that there 
are structural (anatomical) and functional (physiological) differences between 
them. Such differences are greater in the range of (more innate) transmission 
and less in terms of (more learned) perception. Differences come to the fore 
depending, more or less, on the stage and/or level of processing, cf. cerebral, 
nervous, and organic. Synthesis and analysis are classes of operations and pro-
cesses that involve speech circuits (generators and analyzers), the processing 
of cognitive patterns and impressions, speech pathways (nerves) (motor and 
sensory), the processing of electrical impulses, speech organs (effectors and 
receptors), motion processing, and acoustic vibrations.
There are at least several methods used to detect neural circuits involved 
in the processing of (neuro)motor and (neuro)sensory messages, inter alia, on 
one (transmitting) side, observing cerebral stimulation and (absence) motor 
response, or recording the correlation of the corresponding lesions and aphasia, 
and on the other (receiving) side, observing acoustic stimulation and (in) the 
presence of a  sensory response or recording the correlation of the correspond-
ing lesions and agnosia. 50
In mammals and birds, (neuro)sensory processing of acoustic messages is 
carried out such that animals, like humans, have neural circuits responsible 
for receiving acoustic stimuli. This involves, first, all sounds (common circuits) 
 50 Charles T. Snowdon, “Language Capacities of Nonhuman Animals,” Yearbook of Physical 





















and, second, some specific sounds (special chains) – specifically, species-specific 
voice signals. In this respect, lateralization of the left hemisphere and superior 
temporal localization are observed in communication between birds and mam-
mals. It turns out that the left hemisphere (through the right ear) recognizes 
sounds faster and more correctly than the right hemisphere (through the left 
ear), and lesions in the left hemisphere are more likely to cause (neuro)sensory 
dysfunction than lesions in the right hemisphere.
(Neuro)motor processing of acoustic messages in mammals and birds is car-
ried out in such a  way that animals, like humans, have neural circuits respon-
sible for the transmission of acoustic stimuli, where: structures and functions 
correspond to each other in such a way that the hypothalamus is responsible for 
motivational functions, cerebellum – for control-respiratory functions, cingulate 
gyrus – for control-resonance functions and (pre)motor cortex – for control-
modulating and control-articulatory functions, where: the anterior cingulate 
gyrus controls vocalization in the non-human animal kingdom and the infe-
rior frontal gyrus – vocalization in the human animal world, so it is assumed 
that animal vocalization is more impulsive, and human vocalization is more 
volitional, where: it has been observed that chimpanzee message transmission 
includes volitional gestures and impulsive vocalizations in addition to the 
sounds of lips and teeth.
In fact, both hemispheres are more or less equally involved in biodiacritical 
processing. For example, human left hemisphere processes more precisely (in 
the analysis and synthesis mode) the segmental features of sounds, see example 
of a “left hemisphere” opposition: consonant kura : góra : hura : tura and vowel 
kara : kora : kura, and human right hemisphere processes more precisely (in 
analysis and synthesis mode) prosodic features of sounds, cf. example of the 
“right hemisphere” intonational opposition: You are coming : Are you coming?  : 
You’re coming!51
Transmission
Humans, unlike other animals, have two circuits responsible for transmitting 
messages, namely, an evolutionarily older circuit that remains under paleocorti-
cal (limbic) control, that is, screaming, including laughter and crying, and an 
evolutionarily newer circuit that remains under neocortical (frontal) control, 
that is, speech. Therefore, people, when speaking, control the movements of 
organs: respiratory, resonant and articulatory, which makes their vocal behavior 
more flexible and innovative both on an individual (psycho- and idiolectal) and 
populational (socio-dialectal) scale compared to the vocal behavior of (other) 
 51 Marc D. Hauser, Noam A. Chomsky, and Tecumseh W. Fitch, “The Faculty of Language: 
What Is It, Who Has It, and How Did It Evolve?” Science 298 (2002): 1569–1579; Stephen Pinker 
and Ray Jackendoff, “The Faculty of Language: What Is Special about It?” Cognition 95, no. 2 
(2005): 201–236.
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animals. Of course, speech developed due to anatomical structures and physi-
ological functions, which, first of all, performed the functions of breathing and 
swallowing (adaptation), and second, were used for speaking (exaptation).
Phonation, or sound synthesis, includes (at least) three stages: breathing, reso-
nance and articulation, while at each stage, there are some differences between 
animals: human and non-human; namely, several critical structures were dis-
covered, (un)availability of which determines the functions of human speech.52
First, an animal moves and breathes in such a  way that there is synchro-
nization between the breathing rate and movement (inhalation and exhalation 
are approximately the same length), while a  man speaks and breathes in such 
a way that there is no synchronization between the frequency of breathing and 
speech (exhalation is much longer than breathing); moreover, speech determines 
breathing, and its prosodic characteristics are especially active in this respect.53
Second, an animal has a  larynx with a  different structure and function, 
namely, the larynx in both mammals and birds in passive state is high and is 
low if active, while human larynx is located low (lower in comparison with all 
mammals and birds) both in the passive state (silence) and in the active state 
(speaking), also humans are born with a  high larynx, then, starting from the 
third month to the third year, the larynx moves down. It is important to note 
that there are vocal cords in the larynx that are involved in the synthesis of 
voiced/voiceless sounds.54
Third, an animal has a  vocal tract in the shape of the Greek letter iota, 
which means that the entire tongue is in the mouth, while in humans, the vo-
cal tract is in the shape of the Greek letter gamma, which allows the human to 
regulate the size of the oropharyngeal cavities with the help of the muscles of 
the hyoid bone and tongue, as a result of which the tongue is fully or partially 
located in the mouth and pharynx. In addition, the soft palate is involved in 
the synthesis of nasal sounds, and loss of air sacs present in (other) animal 
anatomy allows vowel sounds to be synthesized at the expense of the impor-
tance of vocalization.55
 52 Terrence Deacon, The Symbolic Species: The Coevolution of Language and the Brain 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997); Terrence Deacon, “Language Evolution and 
Neuromechanismus,” in A Companion to the Cognitive Science, ed. William Bechtel and George 
Graham (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 2012–2225.
 53 Ann M. MacLarnon and Gwen P. Hewitt, “The Evolution of Human Speech: The Role 
of Enhanced Breathing Control,” American Journal of Physical Anthropology 109, no. 3 (1999): 
341–363.
 54 Philip Lieberman, “Motor Control, Speech, and the Evolution of Human Language,” 
in Language Evolution, ed. Morten H. Christiansen and Simon Kirby (New York: Oxford 
Scholarship Online, 2003), 255–271.
 55 Tecumseh Fitch, “The Evolution of Speech: A Comparative Review,” Trends in Cognitive 





















It is important to note that auditory transmission has been observed in birds 
and mammals, namely, a  strong relationship (significant correlation) between 
the communicative activity of the sender and the communicative presence of 
the recipient. The point is that the sender transmits only if or mainly when 
the sender knows that the recipient is receiving, otherwise, that is, when the 
sender knows that the recipient is not receiving or does not know whether the 
recipient is receiving, the sender does not transmit. It is obvious that the sender 
communicates with the recipient: arbitrarily or specifically, for example, due to 
the (non-)presence of some biotic and/or social feature. For example, first, it has 
been observed that some birds (hens) are more likely to transmit food messages 
more often when a  female (partner) is nearby than when a male (competitor)56 
is nearby; second, it has been observed that certain mammals (guenons) are 
more likely and willing to transmit disturbing messages when a blood relative 
is nearby than when there is a  related individual in the proximity.57
Auditorium observations can be interpreted in different ways, namely, they 
can constitute a  pre-condition that determines whether animal transmissions 
are volitional (as a result of a flexible decision) or impulsive (as a result of a rigid 
reaction). However, it is possible that they fall between the first and the other.
Reception
Human and non-human animals process physical waves (substances) – in terms 
of psychic sensations (forms) and communication signals (functions) – in terms 
of their characteristics (compare, on the one hand, the spectrum of sound and, 
on the other hand, its vibration, intensity and duration). Sound processing 
in the brain is carried out in such a  way that, first, the (projective) primary 
cortex bilaterally (separately) analyzes the physical (acoustic) features, that is, 
more continual values, for example sounds: tones and noises, and, second, the 
secondary (associative) cerebral cortex analyzes (together) language features, that 
is, more discrete (phonetic) values, including segmental (more left hemispheric) 
values: consonants (±), syllable (±) and sonorous (±), as well as prosodic (more 
right hemispheric): high (±), loud (±), long (±). Naturally, each species has 
a  specific set of code features that differentiate between message functions.58
There are at least two thresholds of animal auditory processes: first, the 
(non-)hearing threshold, and second, the threshold of (in)acute hearing, where 
each threshold has two boundaries – lower and upper, which refer to the species 
(primary) and individual (secondary). Animals perceive acoustic (> 20 < 20,000 
 56 Marcel Gyger and Peter Marler, “Food Calling in the Domestic Fowl, Gallus gallus: The 
Role of External Referents and Deception,” Animal Behaviour 36 (1988): 358–365.
 57 Dorothy L. Cheney and Robert M. Seyfarth, “Vervet Monkey Alarm Calls: Manipulation 
through Shared Information,” Behaviour 94 (1985): 150–166.
 58 Stephen Pinker and Paul Bloom, “Natural Language and Natural Selection,” Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences 13, no. 4 (1990): 707–784.
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Hz), infrasonic (< 20 Hz) and ultrasonic (> 20,000 Hz) messages. Infrasound 
messages (in the communicative function) are better perceived by non-human 
animals than by human ones (and more often by larger than smaller, by sea 
than land animals), while ultrasonic messages (in communication function) are 
better received by non-human animals – more often by smaller than larger ones 
and better by terrestrial than marine ones. Second, a  man perceives sounds 
in the range (16) 20–20,000 Hz, including: sounds (speech) in the range (500) 
1000–3000 Hz. It is important to note that the auditory ossicles in the middle 
ear are responsible for the sharp hearing of speech sounds, where the limits are 
2,000–4,000 Hz, that is, the range required for acute hearing of sounds, which 
corresponds to the high hearing acuity of humans and the low hearing acuity 
of chimpanzees. Therefore, it is assumed that the structure: auditory cortex and 
its function: acute hearing constitute linguistic adaptation.59
2.1.4.2. Interpretations
Anatomical and physiological differences between human and non-human ani-
mals result in human synthesizing and analyzing several hundred (motor and 
sensory) voice samples, cf. (allo)phone(s), that represent from -teen to -ty (motor 
and sensory) voice types, cf. phoneme(s) (for comparison: chimpanzees do not 
produce, for example, high vowels and back consonants).
First, animals (human and non-human) send signals in codes in strict 
dependence on the function (goals) and structures (components) of messages, 
that is, depending on what (the purpose) is and to whom (component) the 
signal is sent. It also depends on where and when they emit signals. In other 
words, the sender adapts the message to the recipient by distributing portions 
of information and emotions, for example, due to the (un)availability of certain 
(biotic and/or social) characteristics of the recipient. Second, animals (human 
and non-human) transmit and receive messages in such a  way that they tune 
to each other, namely, on the one hand, the sender adjusts the physical char-
acteristics of the message for a  specific recipient (normalization), on the other 
hand, the recipient identifies the physical characteristics of the message of 
a  particular sender (discrimination). Third, animals (human and non-human) 
perceive sounds (segmental and prosodic) in a  categorical way, that is, they 
assign one mental unit, for example, (phone)mic to many physical units, for 
example, (phone)etic.60
Therefore, it can be assumed that the differences in diacritical transmission 
between humans and non-human animals are associated with the fact that cog-
 59 Ignacio Martinez et al., “Auditory Capacities in Middle Pleistocene Humans from the 
Sierra de Atapuerca in Spain,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America 101, no. 27 (2004): 9976–9981.
 60 Bridget Samuels, Marc Hauser, and Cedric Boeckx, “Do Animals Have Universal 
Grammar? A  Case Study in Phonology,” in The Oxford Handbook of Universal Grammar, ed. 





















nitive (pre)adaptations are older, and behavioral (pre)adaptations are younger. 
Therefore, for example, non-human animals are better recipients than senders, 
which means that the representation (the sender’s synthesis) is more rigid in the 
imitative sense, and the interpretation (the recipient’s analysis) is more flexible 
in the creative sense, inter alia, non-human animals do not have some typically 
human (pre)adaptations, cf. weaker coverage of theory of mind, lower working 
memory, and especially lower degree of vocalization control.
2.2. (More) Artificial Biocommunication
From the beginning of the 20th to the beginning of the 21st century, a number 
of individuals, representatives of several species of mammals and birds, namely, 
non-apes, including dolphins, such as bottlenose Pho, and parrots, such as 
African gray parrot Alex, and monkeys, including non-chimpanzees, for exam-
ple, gorilla Koko and orangutan Chantek, and chimpanzees including non-com-
mon chimpanzees, such as Kanzi and Panbanisha, and common chimpanzees, 
such as Gua and Viki, Washoe and Nim, Sarah and Lana, Austin and Sherman, 
were taught language and speech under strictly laboratory conditions.61
Of course, talking animals are not limited by just these few representatives. 
However, research has primarily focused on the hominid family, cf. orangutan: 
Bornean and Sumatran, gorillas: Eastern and Western, mountain and lowland, 
chimpanzee: common and pygmy. The studies of artificial communication in 
animals included teaching artificial communication, that is, in English, first, 
through acoustic (oral) contact, and second, via optical (manual) contact, and: 
first of all, elderly individuals in the field of sign gestures, and second, younger 
individuals in terms of symbolic lexes. It is important to note that the changes 
in the curriculum were the responses of teachers (educators) to the failures (to 
a greater extent) and successes (to a  lesser extent) of their students (‘boarders’).
 61 Winthrop N. Kellogg and Donald A. Kellogg, The Ape and the Child: A  Study of 
Environmental Influence Upon Early Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1933); 
Cathy Hayes, The Ape in Our House (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1951); Duana 
M.  Rumbaugh, Language Learning by a  Chimpanzee: The LANA Project (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1977); Herbert S. Terrace, Nim: A  Chimpanzee Who Learned Sign Language 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Francine G. Patterson and Eugene Linden, The 
Education of Koko (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981); David Premack and Ann 
J. Premack, The Mind of an Ape (New York: Norton, 1983); Sue E. Savage-Rumbaugh, Ape 
Language: From Conditioned Response to Symbol (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); 
Allen R. Gardner, Beatrice T. Gardner, and Thomas E. Van Cantfort, Teaching Sign Language 
to Chimpanzees (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989); Sue T. Parker, Robert 
W.  Mitchell, and Lyn H. Miles, The Mentality of Gorillas and Orangutans (Cambridge, 1999); 
Sue E. Savage-Rumbaugh and Roger Lewin, Kanzi: The Ape at the Brink of the Human Mind 
(Wiley: John Wiley & Sons, 1996).
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Studies on communication (pre)adaptations and (pre)dispositions of (non-
human) animals were conducted, taking into account their “linguistic abili-
ties” and “speech skills” at four levels: pragmatic, semantic, grammatical, and 
diacritical. Therefore, training of animals, especially those closest to humans, 
chimpanzees (first common, then pigmy ones) in the field of linguistic pres-
entation of information and verbal interpretation of intentions went through 
four successive stages: diacritical (30–40s), for example, Gua and Viki, semantic 
(60–70s) – Washu and Nim, grammatical (70 and 80s) – Sarah and Lana, and 
pragmatic (80–90s) – for example, Austin and Sherman, Kanzi and Panbanisha.62
2.2.1. Observations
The study of animal artificial communication has resulted in some interesting 
observations (facts) and interpretations (hypotheses) that can be summarized 
in several points, organized into several domains.63
Biopragmatic domain. First, when communicating with humans, animals 
show communicative-behavioral congruence, that is, there is a  correlation be-
tween the cognitive (meaning) and behavioral aspects of communication, that 
is, between what they communicate first, and what they do afterwards. Second, 
animals transmit and receive messages that perform either at least an expressive 
function or at most an impressive function, but do not perform a  referential 
(higher) function in the message. In other words, animal messages, directed at 
humans, are always imperatives, and never declaratives. Third, animal-human 
communication is largely based on monological messages, and to a  lesser ex-
tent – on dialogical messages. Fourth, animals do not initiate communication 
with humans and do not exhibit communicative inventiveness in their relation-
ship with humans, namely, the longer they learn from humans, the more they 
imitate them.
 62 Two methods were used in the research: (1)  animals were taught grammatical-semantic 
representations of information (specific to human language); (2) animals were taught pragmatic- 
diacritic interpretation of intentions (specific to human speech).
 63 Allen R. Gardner and Beatrice T. Gardner, “Teaching Sign Language to a  Chimpanzee,” 
Science 165 (1969): 664–672; Herbert S. Terrace, Laura Ann Petito, Roger Saunders, and Thomas 
G. Bever, “Can an Ape Create a  Sentence?,” Science 206 (1979): 891–902; Francine P. Patterson, 
“The Gestures of a Gorilla: Language Acquisition in Another Pongid,” Brain Lang. 5 (1978): 72–97; 
Lyn H. Miles, “Apes and Language: The Search for Communicative Competence,” in Language 
in Primates: Perspectives and Implications, ed. Judith De Luce and Hugh T. Wilder (New 
York: Springer, 1989), 43–61; Patricia M. Greenfield and Sue E. Savage-Rumbaugh, “Imitation, 
Grammatical Development, and the Invention of Protogrammar by an Ape,” in Biological and 
Behavioral Determinants of Language Development, 235–258; Patricia M. Greenfield and Sue 
E. Savage-Rumbaugh, “Grammatical Combination in Pan Paniscus: Processes of Learning and 
Invention in the Evolution and Development of Language,” in Language and Intelligence in 
Monkeys and Apes: Comparative Developmental Perspectives, ed. Sue T. Parker and Kathleen 





















Biosemantic domain. First, animals understand the relationship between 
a word and a thing. Second, they understand the relationship between one word 
and another word, for example, they can provide verbal equivalence and gener-
alization for a given word. Third, animals learn and use words with a semantic 
function, namely: static words, names of things and names of their properties, cf. 
specific and abstract nouns, and dynamic words, names of actions and names 
of their characteristics, cf. subjective and objective verbs, that is, with an active 
subject, compare attribute (action) of a subject, or with a passive object, compare 
attribute (location) of an object, in the main role. Fourth, animals do not learn 
and use words with grammatical function. Compare, for example, conjunctions 
(relators), and pragmatics, cf. partitions (modifiers), so the units of language 
and speech, which are sentences and texts (par excellence), are beyond their 
capabilities. So are the phenomena that are key to human languages: prediction 
and proposition, as well as metalanguage and metatext.
Biogrammatic domain. First, grammatical combinations are either some-
one else’s imitations (human, including European: English), cf. SVO order, or 
their own inventions (chimpanzees, including African: Bushmen?), compare 
OVS order. Second, animal combinations tend to have linear stabilization and 
iconization. Third, animals construct grammatical combinations, the elements 
of which are bound by a  (non-)recursive concatenation operation rather than 
a  non-recursive dominance operation; ergo: animals do not (trans)form struc-
tures: neither obligatory nor optional, namely, they do not build lexical phrases, 
for example, NP and VP, and functional phrases, for example, IP and CP, nor 
do they form sentences: first, negative and passive, second, interrogative and 
imperative. Fourth, grammatical combinations make up no more than a dozen 
or so per cent of the messages corpus, with combinations usually consisting of 
two lexemes or two gestures. It is important to note that animals do not use 
logical functors (although their combinations may appear to resemble paratactic 
constructions).
2.2.2. Interpretations
The history of research of artificial communication in the hominid family 
has fewer successes and more failures. They both allow us to hypothesize 
the boundaries separating communication types between on the one hand, 
Homo, and on the other hand, Pan, Lord, Gorilla, Pongo. In the 20th century, 
there have been attempts to show that (non-human) animals under artificial 
conditions can master human language and speech within the following lim-
its: pragmatically cooperative, semantically symbolic, grammatically syntactical, 
diacritically-volitional. In the 21st century, attempts have been made to show 
that (non-human) animals cannot master human language and speech and 
reach in natural and/or artificial conditions at least pragmatically competitive, 
semantically indexed, grammatically phonotaxic, diacritically impulsive level, and 
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at most achieving pragmatically instrumental, semantically iconic, grammati-
cally idiomatic, diacritically auditory degree. The attempts of the 20th century 
failed and the attempts of the 21st century were successful for several reasons, 
where each reason determined the limits (negative for failure and positive for 
success) of the abilities and skills of animals (non-human), that is, phylogenetic 
(pre)adaptations and ontogenetic (pre)dispositions: first, communicative, second, 
cognitive and behavioral. Now the research results support the hypothesis that 
at best animals reach the proto-language and proto-speech threshold, but do not 
achieve the representation of information at the universal grammar (UG) level 
and interpretation of intention at the theory of mind (TM) level.64
3. Conclusion
The contribution of scientific disciplines to the reflection on the boundaries of 
language and speech is different, namely, in the field of formal sciences, the 
a  priori problem of what language cannot be is considered, and in the field of 
empirical sciences, a posteriori question of what language can be is considered. 
Moreover, formal linguistics estimates that there is potentially an infinite 
(uncountable) number of languages  (formal codes). On the other hand, empiri-
cal linguistics states that there is (and will be) a  finite (countable) number of 
languages  (empirical codes). Material linguistics asserts that there are several 
(-thousand or -hundred and -ty or -teen) ethnic languages (phenotypic codes), 
while theoretical linguistics assumes that there is one natural language (geno-
type code) as a  generalization of the expansion and abstraction of the intensi-
fication of the terms language and speech.65
Therefore, in my opinion, linguistic and speech universals can include, on 
the one hand, immanent features, that is, features common to (many) ethnic 
languages compared to each other (from an intra-linguistic perspective), and 
 64 Tomasz Nowak, “Przyczynek do studiów nad biologiczną ewolucją komunikacji. Na tropie 
pewnej hipotezy,” Zoophilologica. Polish Journal of Animal Studies 1 (2015): 133–147; Tomasz 
Nowak, “Czy język mógł powstać samorzutnie? O  pewnej koincydencji w  ewolucji języka,” in 
Biological Turn. Idee biologii w humanistyce współczesnej, ed. Dobrosława Wężowicz-Ziółkowska 
and Emilia Wieczorkowska (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2016), 130–145; 
Tomasz Nowak, “Przetwarzanie języka/mowy w  umyśle/mózgu na tle wyników wybranych 
eksperymentów neurolingwistycznych,” Logopedia Silesiana 5 (2016b): 54–80; Tomasz Nowak, 
“W kręgu modeli neurolingwistycznych: wybrane propozycje i wstępne interpretacje,” Logopedia 
Silesiana 5 (2016a): 31–53; Tomasz Nowak, “Studia nad filogenezą języka i  mowy jako zwier-
ciadło, w  którym przeglądają się nowoczesne koncepcje lingwistyczne,” Teksty z  Ulicy. Zeszyt 
memetyczny 18 (2017): 81–115.





















transcendent features, that is, features specific to (one) natural language com-
pared to the communicative abilities and skills of non-human animals (from 
an external-linguistic perspective). In this paper, I consciously follow the second 
of the outlined paths.
3.1. Universals
Biosemiotics, like any other field of knowledge at some stage of its develop-
ment, seeks generalizations, that is, universals – first, local universals common 
to all individuals of one species, and, second, global universals common to all 
individuals of each species.
Biosemiotic universals are communicative meanings: stricte or largo (cogni-
tive and/or behavioral) phylogenetic pre-adaptations and ontogenetic predis-
positions, active in specific domains: functional, cf. pragmatic interaction and 
diacritic transmission, and structural, cf. semantic signaling and grammatical 
combination, that is, abilities and communication skills, common to all speci-
mens of all species, cf. some mammals respond to the alert messages of some 
birds, and some birds respond to the alert messages of some mammals, for 
example, guenons can fall prey to eagles and leopards and the yellow-billed 
hornbill can fall prey of the eagle, but not of the leopard, therefore the hornbill 
actively reacts to the sounds, on the one hand, of the eagle, and, on the other 
hand, to the cries of guenons when they see an eagle.
Biolinguistic universals, a  subset of biosemiotic universals, are features of 
every human being (always and everywhere), in contrast to features that neither 
human has (never and nowhere), whereas the features of every human being 
(always and everywhere) are the features of only humans or the characteristics 
of humans, that is, features that partially belong (at the same time) to some 
non-humans (separately) and to all people as a  whole (together) as a  result of 
synergistic and emerging joint evolution.66
Biolinguistic universals form the foundation of an abstract natural language 
(in the singular) as a  generalization of specific ethnic languages (in the plural), 
and in each case, two values are distinguished (like the obverse and the reverse), 
that is, language and speech. In this article, when using the terms language and 
speech, I  take (and will take) into account only their biological interpretation. 
In other words, when I ask about the limits of language and speech, I am also 
asking about their biolinguistic universals.67
 66 Charles F. Hockett, “The Origin of Speech,” Scientific American 203 (1960): 68–111; 
Charles F. Hockett, “The Problem of Universals in Language,” in Universals of Language, ed. 
Joseph Greenberg (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1966), 1–29.
 67 The terms language and speech have different contents and scopes, depending on the 
accepted point of view: psychological, sociological or biological, for example, first, language 
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3.2. Boundaries
Biosemiotics penetrates the sign communication of living organisms, assigning 
itself, on the one hand, semiotic phenomena, for example, pragmatic, semantic, 
grammatical, diacritic, and, on the other hand, biological phenomena, for ex-
ample, interaction, signaling, combination, transmission.
The main question that I  formulate in my work is the following: Is there 
a  boundary, a  demarcating impassable line between the biological and semi-
otic activity of human and (other) animals? I  suggest that in order to find 
an answer to the question posed we should combine the abilities and biose-
miotic skills of human and non-human animals, taking as the basis for the 
comparison a  matrix of intersecting, alternative to each other, biological and 
semiotic attributes, because the comparison of human and non-human animals 
in terms of biocommunication abilities and skills, phylogenetic (pre)adapta-
tion and ontogenetic (pre)disposition, necessarily presupposes the existence of 
a certain comparative base (Latin tertium comparationis). Therefore, I propose 
a  theoretical interpretation grid (correlates of signs and areas of phenomena), 
which will allow, or at least facilitate interpretation of the results of empirical 
observations:
Biocommunicational correlates
1.  Biopragmatic correlate: 
1.1. (only) intentional subject 
1.2. (also) inferential subject
2.  Biosemantic correlate: 
2.1. (only) intentional object 
2.2. (also) extentional object
3.  Biogrammatic correlate: 
3.1. (only) linear construct 
3.2. (also) structural construct
4.  Bioacritical correlate: 
4.1. (only) segmental substrate 
4.2. (also) prosodic substrate
and speech are a  mental entity (mental representation), at the individual level, cf. approaches: 
generative competence – performance and cognitive schematization – elaboration, second, langu-
age and speech are a social entity (social institution), at the population level, cf. the approaches: 
structural system – usus and communicative ideation – discourse, third, language and speech are 
a biotic entity ( life instinct), at the species level, cf. linguistic abilities and speech skills as (pre) 
phylogenetic adaptations and (pre) ontogenetic dispositions for the representation of information 






















1.  Biopragmatic domain: 
1.1. (only) competitive and (at most) instrumental interaction 
1.2. (also) cooperative interaction
2.  Biosemantic domain: 
2.1. (only) indexable and (at most) iconic signaling 
2.2. (also) symbolic signaling
3.  Biogrammatic domain: 
3.1. (only) phonotactic and (at most) idiomatic combination 
3.2. (also) syntactic combination
4.  Biodiacritical domain: 
4.1. (only) impulsive and (at most) auditorium transmission 
4.2. (also) volitional transmission
In my work, I  formulate a  hypothesis stating that biocommunication abili-
ties and skills of human and non-human animals are separated by a  certain 
distance: both quantitative and qualitative. The research results that I  have 
quoted and commented on, allow us to conclude that there are strong, only 
human, biocommunication features, and weak, also human, biocommunication 
features, whereby strong features are present (only!) in human communication, 
while weak features – (also!) in animal communication.68
First, the communicatively strong, only human features are:
1.  Biopragmatic features: 
1.1. domain: cooperative interaction 
1.2. correlate: inferential subject
2.  Biosemantic features: 
2.1. domain: symbolic signaling 
2.2. correlate: extensional object
3.  Biogrammatic features: 
3.1. domain: syntactic combination 
3.2. correlate: structural construct
4.  Biodiacritical features: 
4.1. domain: volitional transmission 
4.2. correlate: prosodic substrate
 68 Naturally, although human communication seems to be more advanced than non-human 
communication, this does not mean that older, atavistic structures and functions do not come 
to the fore in human communication, cf. The meaning of the alternative elements: “only” (for 
animals other than humans) and “also” (for human animals).
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Second, communicationally weak features, also human, are:
1.  Biopragmatic features: 
1.1. correlate: intentional subject 
1.2.  domain: interaction: 
1.2.1. rivalry (at least) 
1.2.2. instrumental (at most)
2.  Biosemantic features: 
2.1. correlate: intensional object 
2.2.  domain: signaling: 
2.2.1. indexable (at least) 
2.2.2. iconic (at most)
3.  Biogrammatic features: 
3.1. correlate: linear construct 
3.2.  domain: combination: 
3.2.1. phonotactic (at least) 
3.2.2. idiomatic (at most)
4.  Biodiacritical features: 
4.1. correlate: segmental substrate 
4.2.  domain: transmission 
4.2.1. impulsive (at least) 
4.2.2. auditorium (at most)
It is important to note that the biological and semiotic abilities and skills 
of non-human animals are subject to assessment: weak and strong, depending 
on the place where the observations were made: whether in the natural envi-
ronment or in the artificial environment, since non-human animals achieve 
better results in an environment that is artificial for them rather than natural, 
compare the degree above the minimum in the field of natural communication 
and the degree below the maximum in the field of artificial communication.69
3.3. Conclusion
In the field of biosemiotics, questions are formulated and answers are sought 
that relate to the extent to which the biocommunication abilities and skills of 
humans and non-humans are achieved in several of the most important areas. 
 69 The brain of animals (human and non-human) has a  high potency, which actualizes to 
a  minor extent: less – in the natural environment (context of passive observation) and more  – 
in the artificial environment (context of active experiment). Therefore, the communicative 
performance of some animals, especially monkeys, especially hominidae, is ascribed the status 





















To put it mildly, biosemiotics deals with how living organisms orient themselves 
in the world of human equivalents: texts, sentences, words and sounds, that is, 
how signs are used, marked, constructed and emitted.
In contrast to the biocommunication of non-human animals, the biocom-
munication of human animals, is, first, pragmatically interpersonal, semantically 
informative, grammatically verbal, and diacritically indifferent, second, in each 
of its domains, it is multi-layered (potentially infinite) and multi-dimensional 
(innovatively innovative),70 see:
1.  Pragmatically polylogical communication: 
1.1. see pragmatic decentration 
1.2. cf. metatext and its texts
2.  Semantically poly-referential communication: 
2.1. see semantic implication 
2.2. cf. hyperonym and its hyponyms
3.  Grammatically polistratal communication: 
3.1. see grammatical recursion 
3.2. cf. the functor and its arguments
4.  Diacritically polymodal communication: 
4.1. see diacritical innovation 
4.2. cf. contrast and its components
The biocommunication of human and non-human animals differs as far 
as finiteness and infinity are different, with differences in (in)finity coming to 
the fore in every biocommunication domain, which makes a  human open to 
infinity, while others animal species are closed in their two-dimensional and 
two-level horizon, namely, in the domains of pragmatic decentration, semantic 
implication, grammatical recursion, and diacritic innovation, where non-human 
animals reach the second degree at best. To summarize, it can be stated that 
phylogenetic (pre)adaptations and ontogenetic (pre)dispositions of human and 
non-human animals are, on the one hand, communicatively-discreet, and, on 
 70 Naturally, the differences in the human and non-human communication are a  conse-
quence of differences: genetic, cf. gene: FOX P2, and systematic ones, cf. taxon: HSS vs LCA, 
anatomical, cf. organ: DP2: BA 44/BA 22, and physiological, cf. process: (E)LAN. I have covered 
these topics in several other publications, therefore I  will not devote more space to them in 
this study. See Tomasz Nowak, “Przyczynek do studiów nad biologiczną ewolucją komunikacji. 
Na tropie pewnej hipotezy,” Zoophilologica. Polish Journal of Animal Studies 1 (2015): 133–147; 
Tomasz Nowak, “Czy język mógł powstać samorzutnie? O  pewnej koincydencji w  ewolucji ję-
zyka,” 130–145; Tomasz Nowak, “Przetwarzanie języka/mowy w umyśle/mózgu na tle wyników 
wybranych eksperymentów neurolingwistycznych,” 54–80; Tomasz Nowak, “W  kręgu modeli 
neurolingwistycznych: wybrane propozycje i  wstępne interpretacje,” 31–53; Tomasz Nowak, 
“Studia nad filogenezą języka i  mowy jako zwierciadło, w  którym przeglądają się nowoczesne 
koncepcje lingwistyczne,” 81–115.
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the other hand, cognitively and behaviorally-continual, which leads to signifi-
cant changes in the point of view of the direction of research, namely, nowadays 
they are increasingly looking for common features, that is, those that could be 
points of exit (LCA) and arrival (HSS) in the biotic and cultural (co)evolution 
of language and speech, in the areas of cognition and behavior, not commu-
nication.
Biosemiotics studies the biological and semiotic activity of living organisms; 
and inevitably the spectrum of issues it deals with is immeasurably vast. As it 
is impossible to say/write everything about everything, in my work I  limited 
myself to only a few, key issues from the point of view of the goal that I set for 
myself. However, one thing that interested me most of all is the following: Are 
there any existing and knowable features (predispositions and pre-adaptation) 
that make up the border between the biological and semiotic competences of 
humans and (other) animals? (In my work, I formulate certain theses and look 
for arguments for them; unfortunately, due to the extensive area of research 
and the considerable volume of the text, I  do not present or analyze counter-
arguments, leaving this issue to my opponents or to readers interested in the 
issue.) I am well aware of the fact that it has not been possible (and probably will 
not be in the near future) to find a  satisfactory answer to the question posed; 
nevertheless, I have made my own attempt to draw this demarcation line based 
on the results of (the most recent) empirical observations. At the same time, 
I  think that we live on the (un)known planet. We know very little. So far, we 
have probably learned a  few percent of human languages and an even smaller 
proportion of animal species languages at most. Therefore, it should be expected 
that subsequent discoveries will change, perhaps radically, our worldview, not 
only in the field of biocommunication.
Translated by Dmitry Kozhevnikov
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